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                                                          SUMMARY 
 
 
Short-term interest rates are key economic variables, yet few people understand how 
these rates are determined. This confusion extends to the theoretical level. In neoclassical 
interest-rate theory for instance, the interest rate is determined by the supply of and 
demand for loanable funds. Contrary to this view, the Post Keynesian approach suggests 
that the interest rate is determined by central banks as a key policy variable in pursuit of 
its monetary policy objective/s. This dissertation examines how the current and previous 
Governors of the South African Reserve Bank deliberately used short-term interest rates 
to exert an influence on the general level of short-term interest rates. In doing so, they 
implicitly adopted the Post Keynesian approach. This view is shared by most central 
bankers today, giving credence to the widespread recognition that short-term interest 
rates are determined as a policy variable and not by impersonal market forces. 
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1 
      CHAPTER 1 
      
                                                  INTRODUCTION     
 
 
How are short-term interest rates determined? In neoclassical interest-rate theory the 
interest rate is determined by the supply of and demand for loanable funds. Contrary to 
this view, the Post Keynesian approach suggests that the interest rate is determined by 
central banks as a key policy variable in pursuit of its monetary policy objective/s. This 
dissertation examines how the current and previous Governors of the South African 
Reserve Bank deliberately used short-term interest rates to exert an influence on the 
general level of short-term interest rates. In doing so, they implicitly adopted the Post 
Keynesian approach. This view is shared by most central bankers today, giving credence 
to the widespread recognition that short-term interest rates are determined as a policy 
variable and not by impersonal market forces. 
 
The dissertation is set out as follows: In Chapter 2, alternative theories of interest rate 
determination are critically discussed. Questionable assumptions in both the loanable 
funds and the liquidity preference theory suggest that both theories are found wanting in 
their attempt to explain the determinants of short-term interest rates. These deficiencies 
are addressed in Chapter 3 with the introduction of the Post Keynesian approach to 
interest rate determination. According to this theory, the rate charged by central banks to 
the commercial banking sector for accommodation is an instrument of monetary policy, 
and not a market determined price. Central banks set short-term interest rates and they do 
so within in the context of a particular monetary policy framework. These frameworks 
are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the movement in the prime overdraft interest rate 
in South Africa during the period 1981-2002 is discussed. The intention of this analysis is 
to assess wether short-term interest rates are set by market forces, or by the Reserve Bank 
as a policy variable. Chapter 6 concludes with the view that, from a South African 
perspective, short-term interest rates are determined in a manner that is consistent with 
Post Keynesian interest rate theory.   
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      CHAPTER 2 
 
    INTEREST RATE THEORY 
 
The theory of interest has for a long time been a weak spot in the 
science of economics, and the explanation and determination of the 
interest rate still gives rise to more disagreement among economists 
than any other branch of general economic theory (Haberler 1958: 
195). 
 
2.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to understand the determinants of short-term interest rates, it is important to first 
define the rate of interest. Once this has been done, the spectrum of interest rates has to 
be divided into long-term and short-term categories. Once we have identified the relevant 
category for each interest rate, we turn to economic theory in order to understand how 
interest rates are determined. As the focus in this dissertation is on short-term interest 
rates, long-term interest rates will be mentioned only briefly. 
 
As far as the determinants of short-term interest rates are concerned, the basic question in 
this dissertation is whether they are determined by market forces or as a policy variable. 
If market forces determine short-term interest rates, then it is necessary to explore the 
dynamics of the supply of and demand for money in the financial markets. In such a case, 
short-term interest rates are determined endogenously as a by-product of market forces. 
On the other hand, if we accept the notion that short-term interest rates are used an 
instrument of monetary policy and are manipulated deliberately by central banks in 
pursuance of their specific monetary policy objectives, then short-term interest rates are 
determined exogenously by the monetary authorities as a policy variable and their goals 
and actions have to be examined. 
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2.2      DEFINITION AND TYPES OF INTEREST RATE 
 
2.2.1      Defining the rate of interest 
 
Interest can be defined as the price a borrower has to pay to enjoy the use of cash which 
he or she does not own, and the return a lender enjoys for deferring consumption or 
parting with liquidity (Bannock et al 1998: 346). 
 
The concept of interest embraces theories of time preference, marginal productivity, 
liquidity preference and loanable funds. The apparently diverse views of interest can be 
grouped into two broad classes: real and monetary. Real theories of interest are long-run 
theories in which interest is the return for real abstinence and the yield on real capital. 
Monetary theories, on the other hand, are short-run theories in which the monetary rate of 
interest is the cost of borrowing money and selling securities, and the yield on lending 
money and purchasing securities. Expressed differently, the real rate of interest is 
determined by the supply of and demand for real savings, whereas the monetary rate of 
interest is determined by the demand for and supply of money (Greenwald 1982: 536). 
This definition implies that short-term interest rates are determined in the money market 
by market forces. The validity of this statement will be scrutinised in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2      Short -term interest rates 
 
The South African money market is the market for lending and borrowing short-term 
financial instruments (having a maturity of one year or less).  It includes the all- important 
interbank market1 and the operations of the South African Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank, 
Bank or SARB). The Reserve Bank intervenes to establish a certain desired ‘money 
market shortage’, or level of borrowed reserves, and this it provides via the interbank 
market. The cost of these borrowed reserves is provided at the Bank’s accommodation 
rate, called the repo rate. These actions, and the Reserve Bank’s repo rate are designed to 
                                                 
1 The interbank market is the market for banks loans and deposits among the various banks. 
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influence other short-term interest rates, that is, money market interest rates, and 
according to Faure (2002: 18) ‘they have a powerful influence on them (money market 
interest rates), bordering on control’ (implying that the Reserve Bank determines short-
term interest rates). 
 
Money market interest rates include the Treasury Bill rate. A Treasury Bill (TB) is a 
short-term money market instrument which is issued by the government. The TB rate is 
the discount at which the Treasury Bill is issued. The TB rate is not stated on the bill 
itself, but like interest rates on bonds, has an inverse relationship to its price. TBs serve as 
a benchmark indicator of money market conditions and act as a reference rate for the 
calculation of interest rates on many other money market assets (Botha 2002: 216-217). 
 
Another key short-term interest rate is the prime overdraft rate, defined as the ‘lowest rate 
at which a clearing bank will lend money to its clients on overdraft’ (Eatwell et al 
1987:282). The prime overdraft interest rate currently tends to be approximately 3,5 
percentage points above the repo rate (although the formal link between the repo rate and 
the prime overdraft interest rate was abandoned in South Africa in 1982). 
 
According to Gidlow (2002: 57) the repo rate, which is fixed by the Bank, influences the 
prime overdraft rate in two ways: first, it directly influences the marginal cost of funding 
of banks and, second, it reflects the Bank’s monetary policy stance:  
 
…therefore even rates of banks that do not participate in the repo 
auctions 2 adjust when the repo rate is increased or decreased. In 
South Africa, lending rates (such as the predominant prime overdraft 
rate) are directly affected by the repo rate, which is fixed by the 
Reserve Bank according to its monetary policy objectives. 
 
The link exists because when the South African Reserve Bank creates a money market 
shortage (as mentioned earlier) it forces a higher cost of capital on the banking system, 
and the banks are coerced (although not forced) to adjust their prime overdraft rates in 
proportion to the increase in the repo rate to maintain profitability. 
                                                 
2 For a full explanation of the functioning of repo auctions, see Gidlow (2002: 59- 61). 
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Another important short-term interest rate that is linked to the repo rate is the marginal 
lending rate. Gidlow (2002: 58) defines the marginal lending rate as a ‘penalty 
refinancing rate that is (currently) fixed at 5 percentage points above the repo rate.’ The 
marginal lending facility operates by allowing banks to bridge temporary liquidity 
shortfalls not catered for under the repo auctions. The marginal lending rate is charged at 
a premium above the repo rate in order to deter banks from borrowing from the SARB 
(particularly in times of adverse pressure on the exchange rate, when banks often buy 
dollars to speculate against the rand). 
 
2.2.3      Long-term interest rates 
 
Although long-term interest rates are beyond the scope of this dissertation, a brief 
definition and a few examples are necessary. According to Faure (2002:19), the line 
demarcating the money and capital markets is usually drawn on the basis of term to 
maturity of the securities traded, and is arbitrarily determined to be one year. Broadly 
speaking then, the capital market (or bond market) is defined as the market for the issuing 
and trading of long-term securities. Four main types of financial instrument are traded in 
the capital market, namely bonds (such as corporate bonds, debentures, government 
bonds and municipal bonds), variable interest securities, shares and negotiable 
instruments. The rates on these instruments therefore represent long-term interest rates. 
 
Moore (1988a: 258) argues that nominal long-term rates are based on capital market 
participants’ expectations of future short-term rates, that is, of future central bank policy. 
Capital market participants base their decisions with regard to the amount of real saving 
and investment they wish to undertake at the real rates anticipated over the future life of 
the project. These savings and investment decisions interact to determine the rate of 
growth of aggregate income and output, and therefore affect various key macroeconomic 
indices such as unemployment, capacity utilisation, inflation and growth rates. 
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2.2.4      The term structure of interest rates 
 
One of the basic questions concerning interest rates concerns the relationship, if any, 
between short-term and long-term interest rates. The term structure of interest rates is an 
attempt to identify the relationship between these two types of interest rates. A 
diagrammatic illustration of this relationship is known as the yield curve, which 
illustrates the relationship between maturity and yield at any given time, assuming all 
other factors to be constant. The yield curve can be constructed by plotting the yield to 
maturity (YTM) along the vertical axis, while the horizontal axis shows the term to 
maturity (measured in years). According to Oost (2002: 37) yield curves change their 
shape over time in response to factors such as changes in interest rate expectations and 
fluctuations in liquidity in the economy. Several different shapes have been observed, but 
yield curves are usually described as upward (normal), downward (inverse) or 
horizontally (flat) sloped. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 Different possible shapes of the yield curves (Oost 2002: 38) 
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According to the expectations theory, expectations play a key role in determining the 
shape of the yield curve illustrated in Figure 2.1. In an upward-sloping yield curve, for 
example, if long-term rates are higher than short-term rates, and if long-term rates are an 
average of expected short-term rates, then looking ahead these short-term rates must be 
expected to rise. A positive or normal yield curve can be interpreted to mean that on 
average the market expects short-term interest rates to rise. Likewise, a downward-
sloping yield curve is interpreted to mean that on average the markets expect short-term 
interest rates to fall. Such a yield curve often prevails when interest rates are high because 
of tight monetary policies. Under these circumstances there may also be expectations of a 
fall in inflation. A flat yield curve means that the market expects short-term rates to 
remain unchanged, and a humped yield curve implies that short-term rates are expected to 
first rise and then to fall (Oost 2002). 3 
 
2.3      INTEREST RATE THEORY 
 
Interest rate theories can be grouped into two broad classes: monetary and non-monetary 
theories. Non-monetary theories of interest tend to be broad, philosophical explanations 
of why interest rates exist, and seem only remotely concerned with the actual 
determination of the rate of interest in the money market. Non-monetary theorists such as 
Schumpeter (1956) and Bohm-Bawerk (1957), for instance, developed barter-economy 
models for interest rate determination that did not include any explicit variable for the 
quantity or velocity of money. Monetary theories of interest such as the liquidity 
preference theory, direct attention to the many and volatile forces which move short-term 
interest rates.  
 
Interest rate theories can be divided into two main traditions: those in the tradition of real 
analysis and those in the tradition of monetary analysis. This distinction is due to 
Schumpeter (1956: 277-278):  
 
                                                 
3 See Oost (2002: 36-44) for an explanation of other yield-curve theories. 
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Real analysis proceeds from the principle that all the essential 
phenomena of economic life are capable of being described in terms 
of goods and services, of decisions about them …money enters the 
picture only in the modest role of a technical device that has been 
adopted in order to facilitate transactions… so long as it functions 
normally, it does not affect the economic process, which behaves in 
the same way as it would in a barter economy: This is essentially 
what the concept of neutral money implies.  
 
On the other hand, monetary analysis introduces the element of money  
 
…on the very ground floor of our analytic structure and abandons 
the idea that all essential features of our economic life can be 
represented by a barter-economy model (Schumpeter 1956: 279). 
 
Classical economists believed that the quantity of money did not affect the equilibrium 
values of real variables. Milton Friedman, a modern proponent of real analysis, based his 
work upon the quantity theory of money. Friedman (1974:27) stated explicitly:  
 
…we have accepted the quantity theory presumption… that changes 
in the quantity of money in the long run have a negligible effect on 
real income, so that non-monetary forces are ‘all that matters’ for 
changes in real income and ‘money does not matter’. 
 
Friedman, like other neoclassical economists, argue that the factors determining the 
interest rate are real investment demand and real saving – what the neoclassical 
economists called the forces of ‘productivity and thrift’. This is commonly known as the 
loanable funds theory.  
 
To neoclassical economists, the function of money is to serve as a medium of exchange. 
Rational individuals have no desire to hold money for its own sake, that is, to hoard 
(neoclassical economists assume that there can be no willingness to accumulate idle cash 
because it does not earn any returns). Money is simply a ‘veil’ that determines the 
nominal value of variables such as the level of economic activity, while having no effect 
on the real economy in the long run, only on  prices. This view was widely criticised, for 
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…it has to be recognised that essential features of the capitalist 
process depend upon the ‘veil’ and that the ‘face behind it’ is 
incomplete without it (Rogers 1986a: 16). 
 
Keynes (1930) broke away from the tradition of real analysis by arguing that:  
 
…no analysis of actual economic phenomena is complete if the role 
played by money is neglected. 
 
We now examine the neoclassical loanable funds theory of interest rate determination. 
This will be followed by an analysis of Keynes’s liquidity preference theory and its 
implications for interest rates. 
 
2.4      THE LOANABLE FUNDS THEORY 
 
The loanable funds theory is a long-run theory of interest rate determination and is most 
appropriate for explaining long-term interest rates. This theory attempts to identify the 
approximate causes of interest rate variations by analysing the supply of and demand for 
credit. The theory derives from the notion that savers make a decision between 
consumption now and consumption in the future. According to this theory, the rate of 
interest is determined at that level which equates the supply of securities with the demand 
for them, or, stated differently, the factors determining the interest rate are real 
investment demand and real saving – what the neoclassical economists called the forces 
of ‘productivity and thrift’ (Froyen 1996: 66). 
 
The neoclassical view begins with the premise that an individual has many desires in life, 
some of which require instant gratification, while others can be deferred. In deciding 
between instant gratification or present consumption and future gratification or saving, 
the individual is concerned with the opportunity cost of each alternative. This opportunity 
cost is represented by the rate of interest. The higher (lower) the rate of interest, the 
greater (smaller) the opportunity cost of present consumption, the higher (lower) the rate 
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of saving. In Figure 2.2, saving is plotted as an upward-sloping function of the rate of 
interest.  
The saving function is represented by the equation:  
 
S = S (i), where 
S = saving 
i = interest rate 
 
Saving (S) provides the demand for bonds or, as the classical economists call it, the 
supply of loanable funds.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2    The classical theory of the rate of interest  
 
Real investment, on the other hand, is a negative function of the interest rate since the 
interest rate reflects the cost of finance. All things equal, the lower the rate of interest, the 
more investment projects become profitable and the more willing investors will be to 
borrow in order to invest. The investment function is represented by the equation: 
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I = I (i),   where 
I = investment 
i = interest rate 
 
Investment (I) is a negatively sloped schedule plotted against the interest rate. In 
neoclassical terminology, this is the demand for loanable funds. 
 
In Figure 2.2 the intersection of the saving and investment schedules produces the 
equilibrium rate of interest, i1, where S = I. According to the loanable funds theory, given 
an exogenous shock, the system maintains itself in equilibrium at full employment by 
changes in the equilibrium rate of interest. Any fall in investment (a shift to the left of I in 
Figure 2.2), for instance, would be perfectly offset by an increase in consumption, and 
vice versa for a rise in investment demand. Similarly, any shift in the saving schedule 
will cause, via the rate of interest, an offsetting change in investment so as to ensure full 
employment:  
 
The economy can be seen as a seesaw with full employment as its 
fulcrum. On the one end is investment; on the other end 
consumption. A fall of the investment end of the seesaw causes 
consumption to rise by an equivalent amount. Similarly a fall of the 
consumption end results in an equivalent rise in investment. The 
mechanism powering these just-offsetting movements is the 
equilibrium rate of interest. It guarantees that the seesawing between 
consumption and investment will in no way affect its full 
employment equilibrium (Rousseas 1972:95). 
 
Wicksell (1936) referred to the equilibrium interest rate discussed above as the ‘natural 
rate of interest’. Any market rate of interest above or below the natural rate would 
automatically result in market forces restoring the natural rate of interest. The natural rate 
of interest is thus the cornerstone of the loanable funds theory:  
 
…the natural rate of interest is the foundation on which the loanable 
funds theory rests and both stand or fall together (Rogers 1986a: 22). 
 
The natural rate of interest is defined as the rate that:  
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…would be determined by supply and demand if real capital were 
lent in kind without the intervention of money (Wicksell 1936:15, as 
quoted by Smith 1984: 25). 
 
A basic conceptual difficulty that Wicksell faced was how to translate the non-monetary 
concept of the natural rate of interest on capital into terms useful in a monetary system, 
so that a comparison between the natural rate (or equilibrium rate) of interest and the 
actual market rate of interest would have meaning.  Wicksell used the concept of the 
normal rate of interest for this purpose:  
 
The rate of interest at which the demand for loan capital and the 
supply of savings exactly agree, and which more or less corresponds 
to the expected yield on the newly created capital, will then be the 
normal or natural real rate. The normal rate, which is a money rate, 
may then be compared with the market rate of interest (Wicksell 
1935: 192, as quoted by Smith 1984:27) 
 
 
Wicksell was searching for a natural rate of interest around which market rates would 
fluctuate according to a cyclical demand and supply factor (Hanson 1969). To achieve 
this, he devised a long-run general equilibrium model in terms of which the natural rate 
was defined. This definition was, however, considered irrelevant because it could not be 
established outside of a one-commodity model. As Leijonhufvud (1981: 35) realised  
 
…the denial of the loanable funds mechanism makes nonsense of the 
notion of a ‘natural rate’ of interest. The Wicksellian theme is lost. 
 
Without any empirical foundations, the natural rate of interest was left ‘hanging by its 
own bootstraps’. The significance of the natural-rate debate meant that ‘it has effectively 
undermined the neoclassical statement of that theory’ (ibid).  
 
Hayek summarised Wicksell’s argument on the actual determination of the interest rate: 
 
If it were not for monetary disturbances, the rate of interest would be 
determined so as to equalise the demand for and supply of savings. 
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This equilibrium interest rate, as I prefer to call it, he christens the 
natural rate of interest. In a money economy, the actual or money 
rate of interest may differ from the equilibrium or natural rate, 
because the demand for and supply of capital do not meet in their 
natural form but in the form of money, the quantity of which 
available, for capital purposes, may be arbitrarily changed by the 
banks (Hayek 1931:272).   
 
Wicksell originally argued that the money rate of interest is ultimately controlled by the 
natural rate, and that a fixed money rate of interest could never cause the normal rate to 
move in that direction. However, Wicksell later admitted that the money rate could in fact 
influence the natural rate. If the money rate of interest could influence the normal rate, 
and if the money rate is set by the banks, then in  
 
…no sense can it be said that the underlying ‘real’ forces of 
productivity and thrift determine the growth and development of the 
system. Money and finance cannot be neutral. The notion of a ‘real’ 
economy separate from money and credit relations forms an 
unreliable and insecure premise on which to base dynamic analysis 
(Smith 1984: 63). 
Keynes was also particularly critical of the classical theory of the rate of interest, for 
instance, he argued: 
…the notion that the rate of interest is the balancing factor which 
brings the demand for saving in the shape of new investment 
forthcoming at a given rate of interest into equality with the supply 
psychological propensity to save, breaks down as soon as we 
perceive that it is impossible to deduce the rate of interest merely 
from a knowledge of these two factors (Keynes 1936: 165). 
 
According to the loanable funds theory, the interest rate can be seen as the equilibrating 
mechanism that assures the maintenance of full employment in the economy (Rousseas 
1972: 95). Keynes refuted this analysis. In order for the ‘neoclassical seesaw’ (discussed 
earlier) to function properly, the interest rate had to equilibrate the supply of saving with 
the demand for investment at its full-employment point. If the interest rate was not able to 
do this, then changes in investment and consumption would no longer be offsetting and 
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full employment would no longer prevail. As Rousseas (1972: 96) points out, in Keynes’s 
view, the neoclassical view of interest rate determination has one critical flaw: once 
investment falls, the investment multiplier would break down the neoclassical seesaw, 
forcing consumption to fall as well (as opposed to the neoclassical view that asserts that a 
decline in investment will increase consumption) and there is, as a result, no automatic 
mechanism, such as the rate of interest, which will ensure that the economy operates at 
full employment.  
 
Keynes’s point was that any theory stating that a fall in investment demand will cause a 
rise (or a fall or no change at all) in the interest rate is telling us nothing at all. 
Neoclassical interest rate theory, on the basis of Keynes’s analysis, was therefore 
indeterminate. 
 
For this reason, as well as the various reasons discussed earlier, the loanable funds theory 
falls short of being a comprehensive theory for understanding the determinants of interest 
rates. We now evaluate an alternative theory of interest rate determination, namely the 
liquidity preference theory. 
2.5     THE LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE THEORY OF THE RATE OF INTEREST 
We now consider a major modification that Keynes made to neoclassical analysis. This 
modification occurred with the introduction of uncertainty which altered the classical 
view of interest as being the reward for waiting or for thrift, to the reward for holding 
assets less liquid than money in an uncertain environment:  
The rate of interest is not the ‘price’ which brings into equilibrium 
the demand for resources to invest with the readiness to abstain from 
present consumption. It is the ‘price’ which equilibrates the desire to 
hold wealth in the form of cash with the available quantity of cash 
(Keynes 1936: 167). 
According to Keynes, the rate of interest is  
 
…in itself, nothing more than the inverse proportion between the 
sum of money and what can be obtained for parting with control 
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over the money in exchange for debt for a stated period of time 
(ibid). 
 
The liquidity preference theory can be defined as a theory of the demand for money that 
depends, amongst other things, on the interest rate. Keynes argued specifically that the 
demand for money is inversely related to the interest rate: the higher the interest rate the 
less the quantity of money demanded (Ackley 1978: 289). 
 
Keynes saw liquidity as flexibility in a world of uncertainty. To accept less flexible 
alternatives, agents had to be bribed, that is, they had to be compensated for holding an 
asset that is less liquid than money. The interest rate, as the representative of this 
compensation, had to be whatever was necessary to convince agents to ‘part with 
liquidity’. The higher the degree of illiquidity of an asset, the higher the compensation 
necessary to convince wealth holders to accept the risks it represents. In an uncertain 
world, people seek a degree of liquidity and it is this demand for liquidity that is a major 
element in the determination of interest rates (Froyen 1996: 88).  
 
Keynes’s liquidity preference theory involved an integration of monetary theory and 
interest rate theory. His analysis of the demand for money, although in many respects 
incomplete, nevertheless went far beyond the neoclassical theory’s simple view of 
money’s role in the economy. Keynes, for the first time, looked seriously at the holding 
of money not merely as a medium of exchange, but as an asset. He accepted the 
neoclassical view of money as a medium of exchange and that the ‘transactions demand 
for money’ depends on the money value of output or income, but he broke away from 
neoclassical monetary theory by arguing that there were at least two other components of 
the demand for money – a ‘precautionary demand’ and a ‘speculative demand’. Each of 
these was a demand for money as an asset, not as a medium of exchange (Ackley 1978: 
290). Wells (1995:18), for instance, argues that: 
 
…liquidity preference theory is based precisely on the perception 
that money can be more than just a means of circulation, oiling the 
economic machine, but can also become a form of wealth, an asset. 
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The breakdown of the demand for money into precautionary and speculative demands 
plays a vital part in the theory advanced by Keynes to explain the interest rate. As 
mentioned, the proposition that money is held for transactionary and precautionary 
purposes does not conflict with the neoclassical view of the demand for money (a 
transactions balance is nothing more than money in its function as a medium of 
exchange, and a precautionary balance can be added to the neoclassical system without 
materially affecting its conclusions). The speculative demand for money, on the other 
hand, represents a distinct break with neoclassical theory (Shapiro 1966: 292-293).  
 
Neoclassical theory assumes that a person would hold no money in excess of the amount 
needed to meet his transactions requirements. To do so would be to forego the interest 
that could be earned by putting that money into an interest-bearing asset. The reasoning 
was that, even if the rate of interest were very low, it is better to get some return than 
none at all. Keynes pointed out, however, that one who buys a bond is ‘speculating’ that 
the interest rate will not rise appreciably during the period in which he intends to hold the 
bond. If he believed that it would rise, he would be wise to hold non interest-bearing 
money. It is this uncertainty as to the future rate of interest that causes people to hold 
money for speculative purposes. If the future rate of interest were known with certainty, 
there would be no speculative demand for money, and there could be no objection to the 
neoclassical concept of the demand for money (Shapiro 1966: 293) 
 
The speculative demand for money as presented by the liquidity preference theory thus 
represents a distinct break from neoclassical monetary theory. By introducing uncertainty 
into the economic equation, Keynes created an additional incentive for demanding money 
that alters the role of money from its traditional function of being a medium of exchange 
into an asset in an investor’s portfolio. 
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FIGURE 2.3   Determination of the equilibrium interest rate in the Keynesian system 
The Keynesian view of interest rate determination is depicted in Figure 2.3 where the 
money supply is assumed to be fixed exogenously by the central bank at Ms0 (the policies 
of the central bank are assumed to be the main determining factor). In the Keynesian 
system, the equilibrium interest rate, i0, is the rate at which the money demand schedule 
(in Figure 2.3) intersects the money supply schedule, that is, where the quantity of money 
demanded equals the quantity supplied. Factors affecting the supply of money and the 
demand for money determine the equilibrium interest rate. The liquidity preference 
theory states that the demand for money is inversely related to the interest rate - the 
higher (lower) the rate of interest the lower (higher) the demand for money. This is 
illustrated by the downward sloping demand curve in Figure 2.3. 
The liquidity preference theory has the surface appearance of being a determinate theory 
of the rate of interest and, in substance, this was the argument used by Keynes in his 
General Theory (1936). Rousseas (1972: 108) argues that the theory is incomplete and 
inadequate because, like the loanable funds theory, it also assumes that the level of 
18 
income is known (since income is assumed to be  unique and stable at full employment 
equilibrium): 
But Keynes’s theory was a theory of income determination and it is 
inadmissible to assume, in order to determine the equilibrium rate of 
interest, that which the theory is supposed to determine (ibid). 
Rousseas (1972: 108) argues that Keynes was going around in circles. The equilibrium 
interest rate could not be determined unless the level of income was known, and the level 
of income could not be known without explicit reference to the rate of interest: 
This merry-go-round approach to the rate of interest ignored the real 
sector of the economy and the demand for money as a medium of 
exchange. Keynes’s theory of the rate of interest simply assumed 
what it was supposed to prove (Rousseas 1972: 109). 
 
Keynes’s liquidity preference theory was adapted by one man in particular - John Hicks. 
Being a contemporary of Keynes, Hicks believed that Keynes’s work on the liquidity 
preference theory provided considerable insight into understanding the determinants of 
short-term interest rates, however, he also felt that the liquidity preference theory did not 
stand up to the rigorous mathematics embodied in general equilibrium theory. Hicks 
extended Walras’s general equilibrium framework into a mathematical piece of analysis 
which, he claimed, could embody Keynes’s method. Hicks’s analysis was called the IS-
LM system. The IS-LM label was applied because it was believed that Hicks’s system 
summarised the four basic pillars of Keynes’s General Theory (1936): I (investment), S 
(saving), L (demand for liquidity) and M (supply of money) (Davidson 1991:26-27). 
The IS-LM model can be expressed formally as a system of two equations with two 
unknowns: 
          Equilibrium in the money market:  
                       MS = L (i, Y)  
Equilibrium in the goods market: 
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I (i, Y) = S (i, Y),    where 
MS = the quantity of money supplied 
L = the quantity of money demanded 
i = the rate of interest 
Y = the level of income 
I = the level of investment 
S = level of saving 
The demand for money is a function of the level of income (via the transactions motive) 
and the rate of interest (through the speculative motive). This yields a relation between 
income and the interest rate that Hicks plotted as the upward-sloping LM curve. 
Investment is a function of the rate of interest (via the marginal efficiency of capital 
schedule), and income depends on investment through the propensity to consume and the 
multiplier. From these two relations Hicks derived his downward sloping IS curve, which 
shows the combinations of saving and investment at which the goods market is in 
equilibrium. The intersection of the IS-LM curve gives equilibrium values of income and 
the rate of interest (King 2002:16). 
Unlike in conventional general equilibrium models in which individual prices adjust to 
clear the goods markets, Hicks's IS-LM model has the peculiar feature that all prices 
except the interest rate are taken as given (exogenous). In this model, the interest rate is 
the endogenous variable and ties the entire model into a neat and determinate package. 
As explained earlier, it is only through adjustments in income and the interest rate that 
equilibrium in the goods markets is restored. Once equilibrium is restored, the liquidity 
preference theory of the demand for money allows changes in the monetary sector to be 
transmitted to the real sector through changes in the interest rate (Greenwald 1982: 557-
558).  
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Because Hicks proceeded as if the rate of interest must be endogenously determined 
(consistent with the ruling general equilibrium paradigm), Keynes’s central notion of 
unidirectional causality became lost in the IS-LM interpretation of Keynes. By 
abandoning Keynes’s partial equilibrium method and no longer treating interest as an 
exogenous variable, Hicks unintentionally but fundamentally distorted the meaning of 
Keynes’s liquidity preference theory. As a result Keynes’s insights into the non-neutral 
processes by which money affects real activity have been obscured and nearly entirely 
overlooked (Moore 1988a: 252). 
 
This criticism is shared by many Post Keynesians such as Lavoie (1984) who reject the 
liquidity preference theory on the grounds that it involves the assumption of an 
exogenous money supply. They argue that in a modern credit economy, the money 
supply is created by the demand for it, so that any change in demand automatically brings 
about a change in the supply. The idea of the interest rate as the price coordinating the 
demand and supply of money is, thus, rejected. The usual procedure of regarding the 
money supply as exogenous and the interest rate as endogenous is reversed so that the 
interest rate becomes the exogenous variable. 
 
Hicks (1981: 139) ultimately admitted that it was a mistake to use the IS-LM framework 
to interpret Keynes’s liquidity preference theory as a theory of interest rate determination: 
 
The IS-LM diagram, which is widely accepted as a convenient 
synopsis of Keynesian theory, is a thing for which I can not deny I 
have some responsibility…I have however, not concealed that, as 
time has gone on, I have myself become dissatisfied with it. 
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2.6    CONCLUSION 
 
The loanable funds theory is a long-run theory of interest rate determination. According 
to this theory, the interest rate adjusts to achieve equilibrium in the loanable funds 
market. This theory, however, fails to be an adequate theory of interest rate determination 
due to certain highly restrictive assumptions regarding its formulation. The natural rate of 
interest (which is the cornerstone of this theory) is defined in a moneyless world and 
cannot be defined outside of a one-commodity model. Neoclassical monetary theory 
views money as if it were identical to any other commodity. Money is thus compatible 
with the neoclassical view of the world based on scarcity: everything worthy is scarce, 
including money. The price of money, the rate of interest, is market determined by a 
market supply and demand mechanism, as are the prices of all goods in the general 
equilibrium neoclassical system. However, in a capitalist economy that uses credit 
money, the classical analysis of price determination, in terms of costs of production, 
cannot be applied to determine the rate of interest because credit is not a produced 
commodity - it is merely a book entry. 
 
The liquidity preference theory of interest rate determination provides an alternative 
approach to the loanable funds theory. This theory is presented in terms of the short-run 
demand and supply of money. This theory also suffers from a number of shortcomings. 
Keynes’s original work on the liquidity preference theory of interest rate determination 
was never fully completed and what was completed was criticised by Rousseas 
(1972:108) as being ‘just as indeterminate as Keynes showed the neoclassical theory to 
be.’  
 
Even later adaptations of Keynes’s original work on the liquidity preference theory of 
interest rate determination suffered serious short-comings. Hicks, for instance, applied 
general equilibrium analysis to policy conclusions reached by Keynes in his General 
Theory (1936) that resulted in the formulation of the IS-LM theoretical framework, which 
assumed away the important implications of uncertainty and interdependence between 
variables in the goods and money market.  
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In the face of the inability of orthodox monetary theory to explain the determinants of 
short-term interest rates, what are the options? The emergence of the Post Keynesian 
view appears to reconcile the behaviour of central banks with monetary theory with three 
interdependent properties, namely: 
 
§ the non-existence of a theory of the rate of interest  
§ the non-neutrality of money 
§ the endogeneity of money and credit (Rogers 1986a: 28-89) 
 
These are the defining characteristics of the Post Keynesian view, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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   CHAPTER 3 
 
 
POST KEYNESIAN INTEREST RATE THEORY 
 
3.1      POST KEYNESIANISM 
 
Post Keynesianism arose in opposition to neoclassical economics in general, monetarism, 
rational expectations and new classical thinking. Post Keynesians support the cent ral 
conceptions and insights put forward by Keynes (1936) in the General Theory but differ 
from him as far as the exogeneity of the money supply is concerned. They also build on 
the work of the Polish economist, Michal Kalecki, particularly in respect of the mark-up 
theory of interest rate determination. 
 
Post Keynesian economics is principally associated with an eclectic group of economists 
located in Cambridge, England. This group included Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, 
and Richard Kahn. In the United States, the founding contributors to the Post Keynesian 
tradition in macroeconomics include Paul Davidson, Sidney Weintraub and Hyman 
Minsky.  
 
The Post Keynesian conceptual framework differs markedly from that of monetarism as 
well as from the neoclassical synthesis interpretation of Keynes’s work (and other brands 
of Keynesianism). Although having its roots in writings of colleagues of Keynes at 
Cambridge, such as Robinson and Kaldor, Post Keynesian economics became an 
identifiable school of economic thinking from the late 1970s, as efforts were made to 
develop Keynes’s original insights and concepts in opposition to the neoclassical 
synthesis (embodied, for example, in the IS-LM model). Post Keynesians believe that 
Keynes provided a new way of analysing monetary economies and other fundamental 
insights that were not captured in the neoclassical synthesis, and that these have 
important consequences for economic theory and analysis (Cottrell 1994: 587). 
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Although there is considerable diversity in Post Keynesian views and approaches, Post 
Keynesians subscribe to certain common propositions which differentiate them from 
leading schools of economic thought. Jackson (2002: 30) argues that these propositions 
include an emphasis on the role of uncertainty and historical time, a deep skepticism 
towards economic models of a general equilibrium nature, a preference for partial 
equilibrium approaches using ‘stylised facts’, the view that money is integrally involved 
in determining real economic outcomes and is best viewed as credit money rather than 
commodity money, and the view that the money aggregates are outside the control of the 
monetary authorities (ie endogenous).  
 
3.2      MAIN TENETS OF POST KEYNESIAN MONETARY THEORY 
 
Post Keynesians deny the causal validity of the quantity theory and assign virtually no 
role to money supply aggregates when analysing inflation. Whereas a typical monetarist 
view holds that growth of money supply aggregates is directly and causally connected to 
inflation, as well as being a potent ial source of economic instability, the Post Keynesian 
view holds that monetary aggregates adjust endogenously to the demand for money and 
credit in accordance with interest rate levels, investment activity and income. From a 
policy point of view, the leve l and growth of money supply aggregates are thus de-
emphasised as being neither controllable by the monetary authorities nor crucial in any 
economic causal chain. 
 
Jackson (2002: 31) argues that this does not, however, diminish the importance of money 
in the Post Keynesian scheme: ‘it is simply that other aspects of money are regarded as 
most appropriate for policy intervention purposes.’ Within Post Keynesian monetary 
policy analyses, the interest rate is regarded as a crucial policy variable, being directly 
controllable by the monetary authorities and a key determinant of the level of investment 
activity through which, in terms of Keynes’s principle of effective demand (explained 
shortly), the economy can be brought closer to full employment. 
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According to (Rogers 1986a: 28-29) the Post Keynesian theoretical framework is closely 
aligned with modern-day central banking. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this theoretical 
framework is based upon three interdependent properties: 
 
§ the non-existence of a theory of the rate of interest 
§ the non-neutrality of money 
§ the endogeneity of money and credit 
 
Each of these properties are now discussed in turn. 
 
3.2.1      The non-existence of a theory of the rate of interest 
 
Post Keynesian monetary theory may best be explained by way of comparison to 
orthodox neoclassical theory. The neoclassical approach to money arises from the 
fundamental presuppositions that underlie the whole neoclassical research program. In 
particular, the neoclassical treatment of money is based upon the general neoclassical 
concern for exchange and the individual. Furthermore, money is seen as a given 
endowment, and therefore as an exogenous variable (as is any input in orthodox general 
equilibrium theory). Money behaves as if it were identical to any other commodity. 
Money is thus compatible with the neoclassical view of the world based on scarcity: 
everything worthy is scarce, including money. The price of money, the rate of interest, is 
determined by a market supply and demand mechanism, as are all goods in the general 
equilibrium neoclassical system. 
 
Calitz et al (1999: 85) argue that the Post Keynesians, in contradistinction to the 
neoclassical approach, regard the money supply as endogenous, and the rate of interest is 
seen as an exogenous variable. As Moore (1988a) emphasises in the arguments that 
follow, in a modern capitalist economy that uses credit money the classical analysis of 
price determination in terms of costs of production cannot be applied to determine the 
price of credit (ie the rate of interest) because credit is not a commodity produced. Post 
Keynesian theorists argue that the properties of their theory reveal that neoclassical 
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general equilibrium models cannot define the rate of interest. The rate of interest must be 
treated as an exogenous variable since it cannot be explained in terms of neoclassical 
analytical principles.  
 
3.2.2      The non-neutrality of money 
 
The Post Keynesian tradition of monetary analysis (as opposed to real analysis) had its 
origins in the 1930s, when Hayek and Keynes recognised the need to escape the sterile 
formalism of the doctrine of neutral money (Davidson 1991). Post Keynesians believe 
that monetary variables have substantive real effects in the long run as well as in the short 
run and their approach falls squarely into Schumpeter’s monetary analysis classification. 
 
The Post Keynesian argument against the neutrality of money is based on two 
characteristics of neoclassical monetary theory: Say’s law and the quantity theory of 
money. 
 
Say’s law rests on the  proposition that supply creates its own demand. The basic idea 
underlying Say’s law is that production, by creating income, simultaneously creates the 
necessary means to purchase that output. Since the willingness to work is motivated by 
the desire to consume, there should be no limit to the sale of any volume of output. There 
is therefore no reason for unemployment, because output should expand to the point 
where the labour force is fully employed in the long run. Unemployment is thus regarded 
as a temporary phenomenon. 
 
The quantity theory of money complemented Say’s law, by providing an explanation of 
the price level. With full employment ensured in the long run and money velocity stable 
and changing slowly over time as financial institutions evolved, the price level was seen 
to be determined by the quantity of money, as illustrated by the basic equation of the 
quantity theory of money: 
 
 MV = PY 
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where the money stock (M) is treated as an exogenous variable and the direction of 
causality is seen to run from the money stock to the price level (P) assuming a constant 
velocity of money (V) in the quantity equation. The quantity theory together with Say’s 
law led to the inevitable conclusion that money is neutral in the sense that, in the long 
run, an increase in the money stock will cause an increase in the price level only, with no 
impact on output. 
 
Rousseas (1986: 110) argued that neoclassical theory  
 
…deals with a barter economy operating under conditions of 
certainty, where money is brought in an as an afterthought, if at all – 
either in the form of manna from heaven or, as Milton Friedman 
would have it, ‘from a helicopter’. 
 
In other words, in neoclassical monetary theory there is no provision for a monetary 
system interacting with the real sector of the economy. When money is brought in, it is in 
the form of the quantity theory of money, in which the money supply is assumed to be 
exogenously determined by the central bank. In the long run, changes in the money 
supply will only affect the level of prices, with no lasting effects on real output and 
employment – which, based upon Say’s law, are in a state of full-employment 
equilibrium. 
 
Post Keynesians refute this analysis. Their argument rests on the principle of effective 
demand to counter both Say’s law and the neutrality of money implied by the quantity 
theory. The principle of effective demand asserts that full employment is a special case 
and that the level of employment is determined by the volume of aggregate demand 
independent of the supply decisions of the individual workers (King 2002:12). The 
Marshallian analysis of monetary equilibrium clarifies the concept of effective demand. 
The analysis suggests that if the economy is disturbed, it is likely to move between long-
run equilibria, rather than to automatically return to unique full-employment equilibrium. 
Keynes (1979: 35) supported this argument:  
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In my view there is no unique long-period position of equilibrium 
equally valid regardless of the character of the policy of the 
monetary authority. On the contrary there are a number of such 
positions corresponding to different policies. Moreover, there is no 
reason to suppose that positions of long-period equilibrium have an 
inherent tendency or likelihood to be positions of optimum output. A 
long-period position of optimum output is a special case 
corresponding to a special type of policy on the part of the monetary 
authority. 
 
 
To see precisely how the principle of effective demand breaks Say’s law, it is necessary 
to examine the behaviour of the rate of interest. If the rate of interest is an independent 
variable (and not an equilibrating force), it cannot be analysed in terms of neoclassical 
principles and there will be no mechanism whereby the economy can automatically adjust 
to a level that will ensure full employment. By refuting the assumption of full 
employment, not only is Say’s law broken, but neither the theory of the neutrality of 
money nor the quantity theory hold any longer (Calitz et al 1999: 87). 
 
3.2.3      The endogeneity of money and credit 
 
The endogeneity of the high-powered monetary base4 is an issue of central importance to 
macroeconomic theory and policy. The orthodox view maintains that the central bank is 
able to control the value of the high-powered monetary base, and so the money stock, by 
the purchase or sales of securities in the open market (ie the money supply is exogenous). 
 
The exogenous money supply function is embodied in the traditional IS-LM model, with 
monetary policy represented by a shift of the LM curve. The monetarist approach 
reinforced the notion of an exogenous money supply and claimed that the rate of change 
of money supply determines the rate of inflation. In orthodox neoclassical monetary 
theory the supply of new loans depends on the availability of free reserves. The stock of 
high-powered money, set by the central bank, determines the stock of money and the 
                                                 
4 The high-powered monetary base constitutes the reserves of the commercial banks. The monetary base is 
defined as the ‘total quantity of currency in circulation outside of banks plus the currency held by banks or 
deposited by banks with the central bank’ (Walton 1994: 307). 
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amount of outstanding loans through the standard money-deposit multiplier. This causal 
relationship is shown below: 
 
M = h (m) x H, where  
 
M = money supply 
h (m) = multiplier 
H = monetary base (ie the stock of high-powered money) 
 
Rogers (1985: 242) argues that if the monetary authorities seek to control the money 
supply then the monetarists recommend that they control the monetary base (H). Given 
that the multiplier, h(m), is stable and predictable, control of the monetary base then 
ensures control over the money supply. It is clear from the monetarists’ argument that the 
direction of causation is assumed to run from the monetary base to the money supply. In 
other words the monetarists view the money supply as exogenous and under the control 
of the central bank. 
 
According to the monetarist explanation, the central bank is able to exert tight control 
over the total money supply through its ability to determine the monetary base (ie the 
stock of high-powered money). This implies a money supply curve that is independent of 
the rate of interest (ie vertical in interest-money space). Complete exogeneity is also 
represented by a perfectly inelastic or vertical supply function in IS-LM space. Moore 
coined the term ‘verticalists’ to categorise the supporters of this view. The monetarists 
assume that central banks ‘exogenously’ set the high-powered monetary base, and that 
short-term interest rates are set ‘endogenously’ in the money market. The monetarist 
position can be illustrated in terms of the diagram presented as Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1    The monetarist view: endogenous interest rate (Rogers 1985:  243) 
 
Moore (1988a: 87-88) argues that this view is mistaken as it ignores an important 
asymmetry in central banks’ discretionary ability to influence the supply of credit money: 
 
Since bank deposits are determined by bank assets, so long as banks 
find it profitable to add to their portfolios of marketable securities, 
central banks will be able to increase the level and rate of growth of 
the credit money supply at their discretion. But in the absence of 
direct controls on banking lending, central banks do not have the 
ability to reduce the level or growth rate of the money stock or even 
the high-powered base at their initiative (my own emphasis). 
 
This follows from the recognition that bank loans are essentially demand determined.  
 
According to the Post Keynesians, the direction of causality is precisely the reverse of 
that suggested by the neoclassical view. Post Keynesians insist that the direction of 
causality is from right to left in the money deposit multiplier equation. The Post 
Keynesian interpretation of the domestic money supply process is summarised by the 
following equation: 
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H = {1 / m} x M, where  
H = monetary base (ie the stock of high-powered money) 
1/m = the credit divisor 
M = money supply 
 
In this expression H (high-powered base money) is now the dependent variable and M 
(money supply) is the independent variable. In Post Keynesian analysis the monetary 
base (H) does not determine M (money supply), but is determined by M (money supply) 
(Lavoie 1984: 778-780, my own emphasis ).  
 
In other words banks can always get the necessary reserves to support whatever level of 
liabilities they have incurred. The only influence that the central bank has on this process 
is to alter the price at which these reserves are obtained. The Post Keynesian 
interpretation of the money and credit divisor then implies that the quantity equation 
should be read from right to left. The Post Keynesian analysis views the money supply as 
perfectly elastic in the short-run at a rate of interest determined by the central bank. The 
case is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2    The Post Keynesian view: exogenous interest rate (Rogers 1985: 244) 
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Moore (1996:3) argues that  
 
…in the real world banks extend credit, creating deposits in the 
process, and look for the reserves later. There is now mounting 
evidence that the traditional characterisation of the money supply 
process…is fundamentally incorrect. To the extent there is a 
reasonably stable relationship between the high-powered base and 
the money stock, and between the money stock and aggregate money 
income, the causal relationship implied is more like the reverse of 
the traditional view. 
 
 
The Post Keynesian view is closely aligned with the position adopted by the Banking 
school. The Banking school was a group of influential British economists who opposed 
the rival Currency school in the mid-nineteenth-century bank charter debate over the 
regulation of the banknote issue. During this period, the Currency school feared that 
inflationary monetary overexpansion would occur unless convertible bank notes were 
backed one for one with go ld. The Banking school, however, disapproved of all forms of 
monetary regulation except the requirement that banks convert notes into coin upon 
demand. The Banking school argued that the volume of convertible notes was 
automatically regulated by the needs of trade and therefore required no further limitation.  
This conclusion stemmed directly from the real bills doctrine5 and the law of reflux6, 
which together guaranteed safeguards to overissue, obviating the need for monetary 
control. 
 
Both the real bill and the law of reflux doctrines embodied the notion of a passive, 
demand-determined money supply and of reverse causality running from prices to money 
rather than vice versa, as in the quantity theory. According to the reverse causality 
hypothesis, changes in the level of prices and economic activity induce corresponding 
shifts in the demand for bank loans which the banks accommodate via variations in the 
note issue. In this manner prices determine the money stock, the expansion of which is 
the result, not the cause, of price inflation (Greenwald 1982: 59-60). 
                                                 
5 The real bills doctrine states that the stock of money can never be excessive as long as notes are issued on 
loans made to finance real transactions in goods and services (Greenwald 1982:59). 
6 The law of reflux asserts that overissue is impossible because any excess notes will be returned 
immediately to the banks for conversion into coin or for repayments of loans (ibid). 
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This point of view is adopted by Post Keynesian economists such as Kaldor (1982), 
Moore (1988b) and Lavoie (1984).  They argue that the demand for advances of credit is 
the endogenous factor and that the direction of causation runs from demand for credit to 
the monetary or reserve base:  
 
It should be clear, however, that the decisive factor according to the 
Post Keynesian view is the flow of credit…. The money stock is in 
fact the resulting factor of the expansion of credit… The money 
stock is a residual and as such cannot be causal (Lavoie 1984: 775). 
 
The ‘verticalists’ or monetarists emphasise the following causal relationships: 
 
H (monetary base, ie stock of high-powered money) => M (money supply) => i 
(interest rates)  
 
The Post-Keynesians, on the other hand, adopt the following view about the causality 
between the key variables:  
 
i (interest rates) => L (demand for money balances) => M (money supply) => H 
(monetary base, ie the stock of high-powered money) 
 
There is a general agreement among Post Keynesians as to the endogeneity of the money 
supply. Kaldor (1982:55) maintained that  
 
…in the case of credit money the proper representation should be a 
horizontal supply curve of money, not a vertical one. Monetary 
policy is represented not by a given quantity of money stock but by a 
given rate of interest; and the amount of money in existence will be 
demand determined. 
 
According to this view, the central bank does not have direct control over the quantity of 
money or the monetary base.  
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From this argument we can deduce that central banks set short-term interest rates 
according to some ‘reaction function’ and that the monetary base (H) is an endogenous 
variable. This ‘horizontalist’ Post Keynesian view has serious repercussions for economic 
theory:  
 
The entire literature of monetary control and monetary policy, IS-
LM analysis, liquidity preference, interest rate determination, the 
influence of public sector deficits on the level of domestic interest 
rates, growth theory, and even the theory of inflation must be 
comprehensively reconsidered and rewritten (Moore 1988b: 82).  
 
This also implies that increases in monetary aggregates are not a major cause of 
(independent) inflation.  
3.3      INTEREST RATES IN POST KEYNESIAN THEORY 
3.3.1      The exogeneity of the interest rate 
 
According to Moore (1988b: 258), it is a mistake to view interest rates as market-clearing 
prices endogenously equilibrating an independent demand for and supply of ‘capital’ or 
‘loanable funds’. The error arises because money is viewed as if it were commodity 
money: 
 
Credit money is not supplied according to some production function, 
with a real resource cost and a rising supply price. Rather it is 
supplied on demand by the central bank as the residual provider of 
system liquidity, at a supply price determined exogenously within 
wide limits as a policy variable by the central bank itself (ibid). 
 
 
In other words, interest rates do not adjust to equilibrate the demand for real capital 
(investment) with the supply of finance capital (savings). Nominal short-term rates are 
established exogenously by central banks in pursuit of their ultimate policy goals. The 
interest rate takes centre stage as being both controlled by monetary authorities and a key 
determinant of the level of investment activity which, through the principle of effective 
demand, determines the level of economic activity.  
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As mentioned, the Post Keynesians maintain that the central bank does not have the 
option of exercising genuine quantitative control over the stock of money:  
 
The accommodation of the private sector demand for money, at an 
interest rate of the authorities' choosing, is a ‘structural necessity in a 
modern credit-money system’ (Moore 1988b: 374).  
 
 
Direct control over the monetary base would conflict with the central bank's function of 
lender of last resort, which is necessary for maintaining the integrity of the whole 
pyramid of money and credit.  
 
Changes in money stock are driven, in the first instance, by private-sector loan demand 
which the commercial banks are obliged to accommodate, particularly given the 
prevalence of overdraft agreements and pre-arranged lines of credit. Having created 
deposit money in response to such demands, the banks then need to obtain extra reserves 
to meet reserve requirements set by the monetary authority. The central bank cannot 
simply refuse to supply the needed reserves as this would court financial disaster. All the 
authorities can do, if they wish to restrain the process of creation of bank money, is to 
adjust the terms on which they supply base money. These terms are dictated by the 
interest rate (ibid). The rate of interest is a 
 
…politically determined distributional variable rather than a market-
determined price (Eichner 1986: 220).  
 
Kaldor (1982: 190) holds a similar view to both Eichner and Moore:  
 
…a given stance of monetary policy is best expressed by a chosen 
rate of interest, and not by a chosen quantity of credit money in 
existence. 
 
In the final analysis, Kaldor (1982: 86) argues that  
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…interest rates will not be endogenously determined by the interplay 
of supply and demand in competitive financial markets. The central 
bank has the power to impose its will on the market and set its 
interest rates where it wants – presumably at the level consistent 
with that rate of investment which, via the multiplier process, will 
validate the government’s full employment policy. 
 
According to Rogers (1986a: 25)  
 
…the rate of interest reflects psychological, institutional, and other 
historical factors which cannot be specified a priori; it is in other 
words, an exogenous variable. 
 
This is precisely what Moore (1988b) and Kaldor (1982) advocated. 
 
What all this adds up to is that central banks adjust interest rates to predetermined levels 
of their choice, based upon their specific policy objectives. In South Africa, for instance, 
the inflation-targeting framework requires the central bank to manipulate short-term 
interest rates in order to lower inflation. If interest rates do rise, it is because central 
banks have consciously taken the political decision to raise them. Kaldor (1982: 126) 
states the case unequivocally:  
 
…at any time or at all times, the money stock will be determined by 
demand, and the rate of interest (will be) determined by the central 
bank.  
 
That is, the money supply is endogenous and demand-driven while the rate of interest is 
the exogenously determined price of money, set and administered by the central bank.  
 
This implies that the central bank is able to exercise its control over the level of short-
term interest rates through open market operations, not by affecting the quantity of bank 
cash reserves, as the money-multiplier paradigm has it, but rather by compelling banking 
institutions to make use of the central bank’s accommodation facilities at the discount 
window, at the interest rate charged by the central bank. Provided that the ‘market is in 
the Bank’(which can always be ensured by appropriate open market operations), arbitrage 
will ensure that market interest rates are held at approximate equality with the central 
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bank’s discount rate. In all well-developed financial systems, changes in bank rate have a 
quick and roughly commensurate effect on the level of short-term market rates. Central 
banks can thus establish interest rates on all bank wholesale short-term securities, which 
affect the general market short-term interest rates (Moore 1988b: 89). 
 
3.3.2      A mark-up theory of interest rate determination 
 
Within both Keynesian theory and the neoclassical synthesis, the rate of interest serves as 
an equilibrating force, that is, as the particular variable that ties the whole system together 
in a neat, determinate package. In the neoclassical synthesis, for instance, the IS and LM 
curves (Hicks 1982) are assumed to be independent of one another and, given their 
relative stability (which eliminates the problem of uncertainty), the level of real output 
and employment and the rate of interest are determined simultaneously. No matter what 
form the model took, the intersection of the IS and LM curves uniquely determined the 
equilibrium rate of interest at which the money and goods sectors were in simultaneous 
equilibrium. The rate of interest, in other words, was market determined.  
 
Rousseas (1986: 51) argues that  
 
…if the psychological factors that underlie the IS and LM curves in 
a world of uncertainty make them, in fact, interdependent, the 
usefulness of the rate of interest as an equilibrating force quickly 
dissipates into a haze of indeterminateness.  
 
 
Moore (1988a: 282) argues that, instead of short-term interest rates being viewed as a 
market-clearing process, a more realistic approach would be to view short-term interest 
rates  
…simply as a relatively stable markup over the discount rate, which 
is administered exogenously by the monetary authorities. 
 
Rousseas applied Kalecki’s (1954) theory of mark-up pricing in order to get the loan rates 
charged by banks for bank credit. 
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Mark-up theory 
 
Mark-up theory assumes an economy in which there are large concentrations of market 
power and in which oligopolistic firms set prices as a mark-up over unit prime costs. 
Likewise, the interest rate can be regarded as the ‘price’ of financial ‘goods’ in the 
financial sector.  
 
According to Rousseas (1998: 64-66), the mark-up equation may be expressed formally 
as P = k (u). This can be rewritten for commercial banks as: 
 
 i = k (u) 
where 
i = interest rate on loans 
k = the degree of monopoly power exercised by individual banks, or, in the 
aggregate, by the banking industry as a whole 
u = the unit prime or variable costs incurred by banks 
  
Mark-up theory can be applied to the banking system because banks, like firms, are in 
business to make a profit. A few large banks tend to dominate the industry. The South 
African banking sector is a good example of an oligopoly. For instance, at the end of 
2001 South Africa’s four biggest banks (ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedcor and FirstRand) 
had a combined market share of 72,7 percent of the market for bank deposits in South 
Africa (Competition News, 10 December 2002). Banks are in the business to produce a 
product – financial services – while incurring certain costs. They are, however, 
oligopolistic price setters in ‘retail’ markets, while being price takers in competitive 
‘wholesale’ financial markets.  
 
The raw materials, or inputs, of a bank are the deposits it is able to attract and its ability 
to borrow funds – both of which are necessary ingredients for its final product – loans. 
Both have costs attached to them: the interest paid on deposits and the interest paid by 
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banks on borrowed funds, and both are determined in highly competitive markets. Other 
costs include the required reserves banks must hold against their deposits and the 
insurance fees levied against such deposits. 
 
The revenues of banks are largely derived from the ‘prices’ charged against bank loans, 
or the pattern of interest rates, and the interest income from their holding of short-term 
investments, such as Treasury Bills. The interest rate is thus seen as the price of the loan 
and is determined by a mark-up over the ‘cost of funds’. The interest rate can also be seen 
as banks’ profit margins. 
 
Profit margins are determined by the lending rates of banks based on the ‘interest rate 
spread’7 needed to achieve pre-determined profit goals. Changes in the gross profit 
margin or interest rate spreads are often caused by competitive scrambles for higher 
interest rate deposits, or by exposure to high-risk loans made by banks to countries or 
firms that end up in virtual default. If future profit margins are threatened by increased 
domestic and foreign loan defaults, banks restore their profit margins by increasing their 
mark-up over prime cost (ie their interest rates). If one bank in particular experiences 
loan defaults it may not be able to increase its profit margins, and will either be forced 
out of the market or it will be bailed out by the central bank (Rousseas 1998: 64-66). 
 
As in the case of prices in other sectors, the mark-up theory of bank loan rates rejects the 
demand and supply analysis underlying the IS-LM determination of the equilibrium rate 
of interest. In this theory, an increase in demand relative to supply does not automatically 
result in an increase in the loan rate. Put differently, an ‘equilibrium’ approach to the rate 
of interest charged by banks is not regarded as being appropriate to the financial sector. 
 
                                                 
7 The interest rate spread is simply the margin, or mark-up, between bank costs and loans. The spread can 
be approximated by the difference between the ‘prime rate’ (rates set by banks for their best customers) and 
the ‘repo’ rate (a proxy for the cost of funds). 
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Rousseas (1986) argues that interest rates are determined by a stable mark-up over costs, 
and that changes in interest rates are consequently dependent on changes in the costs of 
funds to banks – namely the ‘repo’ rate. The implications of this statement in the context 
of Post Keynesian analysis is convincing: The ‘repo’ rate (ie short-term nominal interest 
rate) is determined by the central bank as an administered policy variable. Although there 
are a variety of interest rates in the markets (depending on their nature, maturity and 
risk), this theory maintains that they are all determined on a mark-up basis. 
 
All this leads to the conclusion  
 
…that the notion of a market clearing equilibrium ‘interest’ rate – 
whether in the old ‘productivity-thrift’ theory, or the ‘bastard’ 
Keynesian IS-LM approach, or a market determined short-run rate – 
is a theoretical solution within arcane models bearing no relation to 
the real world. In the universe of economics, interest rates are not the 
equilibrating factor of textbooks. They are essentially a mark-up 
over competitive prime costs in a broadly conceived financial sector 
(Rousseas 1998: 73). 
 
3.4      CONCLUSION 
 
Post Keynesians are a diverse group of economists who share the belief that modern 
macroeconomics leaves aside or explicitly assumes away many of the central elements of 
Keynes's General Theory (1936). They maintain that a number of highly restrictive 
assumptions in general equilibrium theory, including the implications of time, 
equilibrium and uncertainty, render the theory inappropriate.   
 
According to Arestis (1992:201-203), the five basic propositions on which most Post 
Keynesians would find themselves in broad agreement, despite differences over their 
precise interpretation include the following: 
 
First, the IS-LM version of orthodox Keynesian theory is hopelessly flawed, both as an 
expression of Keynes's own vision and as the basis for a satisfactory macroeconomic 
theory after Keynes.  
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Second, attempts to force Keynes's ideas into an explicitly general equilibrium or 
Walrasian mould were profoundly misguided. 
 
Third, neoclassical price theory is irrelevant to the real world of giant corporate 
oligopolies, which are price-makers rather than price-takers and operate according to 
some variant of the mark-up principle in determining the prices of their products.  
 
Fourth, the money supply is not determined outside the economic system by the 
decisions of the central bank. Money is endogenous and the monetary authorities are able 
to set only the price of money (that is, the rate of interest), not the quantity.  
 
Finally, unlike the neoclassical approach, the focus of Post Keynesian economics is to 
explain why the economy does not work well. 
 
Post Keynesians argue that mainstream theory is defective in its method, no less than in 
its substance:  
 
…excessive abstraction and over-elaborate formal analysis should be 
avoided; economics should instead, be grounded on realistic 
assumptions and directed toward important issues of public policy 
(Davidson 1991: 34).  
 
 
When a theory is devoid of any contact with reality (as the Post Keynesians argue about 
the neoclassical synthesis) its policy implications may be irrelevant or politically 
impractical. Davidson (1994: 34), for instance, argues that Keynesian theory, by virtue of 
its reformulation of Keynes along general equilibrium lines, has been moving 
increasingly away from practically realistic policy measures:  
 
Post Keynesian theory therefore presents an attempt, still in the 
process of being worked out, to restore reality to economic thinking 
(ibid).  
 
 
 
42
Post Keynesian monetary theory has not been successful in becoming absorbed in 
mainstream economics because like so much of heterodox economics, it conflicts with 
the mainstream neoclassical paradigm. Nonetheless, Post Keynesian monetary theory has 
provided the basis, albeit implicitly, for monetary policy in South Africa since the early 
1980s, as will become evident in Chapter 5. 
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      CHAPTER 4 
 
            MONETARY POLICY REGIMES 
 
4.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
The Post Keynesian view described in Chapter 3 maintains that in a modern credit 
economy, interest rates are determined exogenously by the central bank in accordance 
with its specific policy objectives. Short-term interest rates are determined within a 
policy framework, and the causes of fluctuations in interest rates may differ from country 
to country, and from time to time in a particular country. The determinants of short-term 
interest rates are specific to the monetary policy framework within which each central 
bank operates. A thorough understanding of the factors that cause interest rates to change 
thus requires an analysis of the context within interest rate decisions are made.  Such an 
analysis requires an understanding of the different monetary policy regimes and their 
implications for interest rate policy. The basic monetary policy regimes include: 
 
§ direct interest rate controls 
§ monetary policy with an implicit  nominal anchor (unconstrained discretion) 
§ monetary targeting  
§ inflation targeting  
§ fixed exchange rates 
§ exchange-rate targeting  
 
First, however, we have to define monetary policy. 
 
4.2      THE DEFINITION AND OBJECTIVES OF MONETARY POLICY 
 
Defining monetary policy and its goals is not a simple exercise. Monetary policy 
frameworks are constantly evolving in response to new developments in financial 
markets. A certain theoretical framework may be in vogue for central banks around the 
 
 
44
world in one era and out of favour in the next. A good example of this was the rise and 
fall of monetarism in the 1980s. In addition, the dynamic nature of globalised financial 
markets implied that the control of monetary aggregates (ie monetary targeting) became 
increasingly ineffective (eg in South Africa after the lifting of sanctions in 1994). As a 
result, different monetary policy frameworks have been used in South Africa since 1980. 
 
Monetary policy, in general terms, has been defined by Meijer (1989: 492) as consisting 
of decisions made and implemented by the monetary authorities in their various fields of 
operation in order to reach or to strive to reach certain ‘ultimate’ objectives regarding the 
national economy. The De Kock Commission (1985: 13.7) also favoured a ‘broad and 
relatively neutral’ definition, that is, a definition not entirely in accordance with the tenets 
of a particular school of monetary thought and which does not limit the scope of 
monetary policy (Coelho 1992: 25). The Commission defined monetary policy as: 
 
all deliberate actions by the monetary authorities to influence the 
monetary aggregates, the availability of credit, interest rates and 
exchange rates, with a view to affecting monetary demand, income, 
output, prices and the balance of payments (De Kock Commission 
1985: 13.7).  
 
Within this broad monetary policy framework, the goals of monetary policy were defined 
as: 
…the maintenance of reasonable stability of domestic price levels 
(the primary long-term objective). While other ultimate objectives, 
such as balance of payments equilibrium, economic growth and job 
creation, should also rank as legitimate objectives of monetary 
policy, even though monetary policy alone should not be used reach 
these various goals (De Kock Commission 1985: 141). 
 
The goals of monetary policy thus extended beyond long-term price stability to concern 
with ‘general economic stability’. 
 
During Stals’s tenure in the 1990s, the goals of monetary policy were defined as ‘…the 
protection of the domestic and external value of the rand’ (Stals 1993a: 31). Monetary 
policy was thus aimed at combating inflation, while also including some degree of 
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exchange rate targeting. This narrower approach contrasts sharply with the multiple goals 
in the De Kock era. 
 
Mboweni, the current Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, defines monetary 
policy as all ‘…deliberate decisions by the central bank to influence short-term interest 
rates’ (Mboweni 2002) (my own emphasis). In other words, monetary policy relates to 
the decisions by the central bank on short-term interest rates. Implicit in this definition is 
a horizontalist view of the money supply or the exogenous nature of the interest rate, as 
explained in Chapter 3. In this framework, the SARB exogenously determines short-term 
interest rates in pursuit of its inflation target and then creates the necessary market 
conditions (through open-market operations for instance) in order to support such an 
interest rate.  
 
4.3   INTEREST RATE POLICY UNDER DIFFERENT MONETARY REGIMES 
 
All central banks conduct monetary policy within one of the monetary policy frameworks 
or regimes listed earlier. In addition to facilitating the decision-making itself, each regime 
enables the decisions to be interpreted within a specific structure or context. The different 
regimes are now discussed in turn. 
 
4.3.1      Direct interest rate controls and their implications for interest rate policy 
 
Direct or non-market oriented policy instruments refer to those measures taken by the 
central bank in order to achieve the aims of monetary policy by limiting or prescribing 
the behavioural pattern of market participants. These instruments are usually associated 
with a suspension of market forces, either through rigid rules or by fixing certain 
important variables. Should market participants not adhere to these rules, they may be 
liable to prosecution or penalties. Direct instruments of monetary policy include interest 
rate controls, bank-by-bank credit ceilings, statutory liquidity ratios, directed credits and 
bank-by-bank rediscount quotas. 
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What are the motives guiding central banks decisions to control the interest rate? These 
motives depend on the channels through which monetary policy decisions affect 
aggregate demand and ultimately inflation. The channels depend, in turn, on the 
theoretical framework used. Interest rate controls were based essentially on Keynesian 
monetary theory, which maintains that firms and individuals respond to changes in 
interest rates by altering their investment and spending patterns. As a result, consumer 
spending (C), fixed capital formation (I) and real output (y) are affected. By maintaining 
low interest rates, the central bank can therefore try to achieve higher levels of 
investment and output. The monetary transmission mechanism in this case is represented 
by the interest rate channel: 
 
¯bank rate ®  (­I, ­C) ® ­y  
 
In South Africa, for instance, deposit interest rate controls prescribed maximum rates on 
the several categories of deposits and other borrowed funds offered or paid by deposit-
taking institutions. The main reason for the imposition of this type of control, as part and 
parcel of the Reserve Bank’s monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s was, according to 
the De Kock Commission (1985: 22.20) 
 
…the wish to prevent an increase in home mortgage rates at times 
when the general level of interest rates tended upwards. It was also 
felt that under conditions of high liquidity, when the general trend of 
interest rates was downwards, deposit rate control was necessary to 
prevent the keen competition between banks and building societies 
from pushing deposit and mortgage rates upwards. Competition 
might also lead to unsound lending at above-average rates and place 
an undue burden on borrowers. 
 
By placing ceilings on interest rates, the SARB was attempting to protect borrowers (such 
as homeowners, farmers and small businesses) from the burden of high interest rates that 
would (supposedly) have occurred had interest rates not been controlled directly.   
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Caprio and Honohan (1990: 26) argue that the use of direct instruments (such as deposit 
interest rate controls) were of limited use. Such controls have been used in many African 
and European developing countries with little success. One of the reasons is that the 
definition of the institutions that were subject to controls gave rise to many opportunities 
for avoidance through disintermediation8 and the development of near-bank and parallel 
credit markets. Other controls, such as bank-by-bank ceilings, also distorted competition 
by penalising more dynamic institutions and discouraging resource mobilisation. Once a 
bank reached its credit ceiling, it had no incentive to compete for additional resources, 
regardless of the profitability of its clients’ investment opportunities. 
 
Friedman (1972: 60-73) argues further that repressing interest rates was a serious mistake 
for any country. If, for instance, interest rates are pegged at a very low level, or if specific 
interest rates are charged on special kinds of loans or special kinds of investments, people 
with political influence tend to have access to capital at these rates. This often results in a 
wasteful use of capital (by employing it in ways that have a low yield). Capital that 
escapes the controls (through disintermediation and grey markets) will command an 
extremely high rate. Meijer (1984:15) drew similar conclusions to Friedman by arguing 
that ‘direct controls impose inequalities, distortions, inefficiencies and a general 
unwarranted loss of economic welfare.’ 
 
An additional cost of trying to maintain very low interest rates is that it impedes the 
development of financial institutions. Friedman (1972: 66) argued that the best way to 
foster an effective and diversified financial structure was to let the financial institutions 
develop in response to market forces. This recommendation has proved to be correct and 
today virtually all direct interest rate controls are acknowledged as causing distortions 
and inefficiencies, and have been abandoned. 
 
                                                 
8 Disintermediation refers to the replacement of credit normally or previously extended through the 
intermediation of a bank or other financial institution, by non-intermediated credit extended directly by 
credit lenders to ultimate borrowers. This definition includes a shift by banks from on-balance-sheet to off-
balance-sheet financing (De Kock Commission 1985: 101). 
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4.3.2      Fixed exchange rates   
 
Exchange rate pegs 
 
A fixed exchange rate policy prevails when a currency is linked to some monetary 
standard and its value remains unchanged within narrow limits except for a major shift in 
underlying conditions. Whenever a change in value is made, it occurs by official 
government action and occurs through either a devaluation (ie a loss in value) or a 
revaluation (ie a gain in value) (Greenwald 1981: 550). 
 
Fixed exchange rates can take various different forms. The most common form in the 
past was to fix the value of the domestic currency to a commodity (such as gold) or to an 
important currency (such as the US dollar) or to a basket of currencies. This is referred to 
as an exchange rate ‘peg’. Exchange rate pegs have two main potential benefits: first, it 
helps to achieve price stability, and second, it makes foreign finance available at a 
cheaper rate by reducing or eliminating exchange rate risk. 
 
Exchange rate ‘pegs’ come in two basic varieties: ‘soft’ pegs, in which the commitment 
to the peg is not institutionalised, in other words, the exchange rate is implicitly targeted 
through interest-rate adjustments (this is also known as exchange-rate targeting). ‘Hard’ 
pegs, on the other hand, occur when the commitment is institutionalised, for example in 
the form of a currency board9 or dollarisation10.  Currency boards choose the ir anchor 
currency for its expected stability and international acceptability. For most currency 
boards, the British pound or the United States dollar has been the anchor currency, 
though for some of the recent currency board- like systems the anchor currency is the euro 
(Mishkin 2001:2). 
 
Fixed exchange rate regimes with ‘hard’ pegs have a poor track record. By fixing the 
exchange rate, a central bank loses the freedom to pursue an independent monetary 
                                                 
9 A currency board is defined as a monetary authority that issues notes and coins convertible into a foreign 
anchor currency or commodity (also called the reserve currency) at a truly fixed rate and on demand. 
10 Dollarisation occurs when the value of a currency is pegged to the value of the US dollar. 
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policy, with the result that shocks to the anchor country, to whose currency the domestic 
currency is pegged, are transmitted to the targeting country (since domestic interest rates 
are determined in the anchor country). Exchange rate pegs thus prevent the central bank 
from conducting open-market operations as well making loans to domestic banks or to 
the government. Therefore it cannot sterilise the monetary effects of its operations in the 
foreign exchange market or even cushion the effects of its operations on the liquidity of 
the banking system. This was illustrated during the financial crisis in emerging markets in 
1994/95 when the attack on the Argentine peso (which at the time was fixed to the price 
of the dollar) led to a fully-fledged banking crisis in Argentina (Kenen 2000:4). 
 
Hard pegs leave countries open to speculative attacks and currency crises, which can be 
costly in industrialised countries, but are frequently devastating in emerging market 
countries, for example, in Latin America (Argentina, Mexico and Ecuador), East Asia 
(Thailand and Indonesia) and Turkey. The breakdown of hard pegs is particularly 
damaging in emerging market countries because their debt is generally short term and 
denominated in foreign currency, so that a successful speculative attack leads to a sharp 
deterioration in balance sheets and ultimately to financial crisis (Mishkin 1999: 580-581). 
 
Given the past experience with hard pegs, few economists (if any) advocate their use as a 
monetary policy strategy. Hard pegs, however, may be desirable, especially in countries 
with weak political and monetary institutions, since they may be the only way to break 
inflationary psychology and stabilise the economy. Hard pegs can be regarded as the 
stabilisation policy of last resort, when it becomes necessary to allow little or no 
discretion to the monetary authorities. However, hard pegs will only be successful in 
promoting a healthy economy if other government policies create the right institutional 
environment for the peg. For example, without rigorous prudential supervision, which 
ensures the safety and soundness of the financial system, and sound and sustainable fiscal 
policy, hard pegs will not be able to stabilise the economy in the long run (Mishkin 1999: 
592). This was forcefully illustrated in Argentina in recent years.  
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4.3.3      Exchange rate targets 
 
Exchange-rate ‘targets’ or ‘soft’ pegs are different from ‘hard’ pegs. If an exchange-rate 
target is being pursued, it is achieved through a deliberate interest rate manipulation with 
its indirect effect on the exchange rate, that is, through the exchange rate channel that will 
be discussed shortly. Unlike the ‘hard’ peg, the exchange rate is not simply ‘pegged’ by a 
currency board. In an exchange-rate targeting framework the central bank determines the 
short-term interest rate as a policy variable in pursuance of an exchange rate range or 
target. 
 
From Chapter 3 we saw that central banks can and do move domestic short-term interest 
rates independently and, ceteris paribus, a reduction in domestic interest rates tend to 
cause capital outflows and a depreciation of the domestic currency. This transmission 
mechanism can be summarised as follows: when domestic real interest rates fall relative 
to foreign interest rates, deposits denominated in the domestic currency become less 
attractive than deposits denominated in foreign currencies and the domestic currency 
depreciates. The lower value of the domestic currency (DC) makes foreign goods more 
expensive than domestic goods, causing a rise in net exports (NX) and hence in aggregate 
output. This can channel can be summarised as follows: 
 
¯ Central bank rate ® ¯interest rates ®  ¯DC ® ­NX ® ­y (output) 
or         ­ Central bank rate ® ­interest rates ® ­DC ® ¯NX ® ¯y (output) 
 
In South Africa, particularly in the Stals era, short-term interest rates were used to pursue 
exchange rate goals, with the ultimate aim of achieving lower inflation. This view is 
supported by the fact that Stals did not consider the declared mission of the SARB of 
aiming at the simultaneous protection of the domestic and external value of the rand as 
being contradictory. Stals (1991:18) believed that these two objectives were 
supplementary:  
 
…and the one can hardly be achieved without the other. In fighting 
inflation, the SARB will at the same time, and with the same 
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instruments of monetary policy, defend the external value of the rand 
(the exchange rate).  
 
Small, open economies (such as the South African economy) rely heavily upon imported 
capital and goods; therefore the exchange rate has an important impact on the inflation 
rate. In addition to the export implications of the interest rate channel mentioned earlier, 
changes in short-term interest rates also affect the capital account (of the balance of 
payments) by altering interest-rate differentials between countries. In the 1990s for 
instance, Stals was determined to stabilise the real effective value of the rand (particularly 
after the destabilising effects of capital outflows following the Asian crisis in 1998) and 
he did so by raising short-term interest rates (ie implicitly pursuing an exchange-rate 
target). This episode will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
4.3.4      Monetary targeting as a framework for monetary policy 
 
Monetary targeting is loosely based upon monetarist principles, where monetarism can be 
defined as:  
…a theory which holds that increases in the money supply are a 
necessary and sufficient condition for inflation (Bannock, Baxter and 
Davis 1998: 278).  
 
Monetarists maintain that if predictions about changes in the velocity of money are 
reasonably accurate, then monetary policy can be used to control the rate of inflation by 
controlling the quantity or supply of money.  
 
The origins of monetarism in the postwar period can be traced to the work of Milton 
Friedman, who initiated a revival of the quantity theory tradition (see Chapter 2). He 
argued for a reform of the monetary and banking system and the adoption of 100 percent 
reserve banking. Such a step, he thought, would impose the properties of the quantity 
theory, which together with the self-adjusting nature of the real economy in the long run, 
would ensure a stable monetary environment that would contribute to growth and full 
employment (Calitz et al. 1999: 76). 
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Friedman’s belief was based upon the proposition that inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon:  
 
…inflation occurs when the quantity of money rises appreciably 
more rapidly than output and the more rapid the rise in the quantity 
of money per unit of output, the greater the rate of inflation 
(Friedman 1980: 255).  
 
Friedman believed that the excessive increases in the quantity of money was the ‘one and 
only important cause of inflation’, therefore a reduction in the rate of monetary growth 
was the ‘one and only cure for inflation’ (ibid). 
 
The monetarists’ approach to monetary policy rested upon a monetary growth rule 
requiring central banks to fix the quantity of money or control its rate of growth in a 
steady, predictable manner. The monetary growth rule was supposed to be implemented 
by controlling the monetary base and allowing interest rates to be truly market 
determined. This growth rule rested on highly restrictive assumptions: First, changes in 
the money supply must be ‘exogenous’ and must not depend on changes in V, P or Y.  
Exogeneity of the money supply meant that ‘causality’, if it existed at all, would run from 
money supply changes to price level changes, or from the left-hand side of the equation 
of exchange to the right-hand side (Chapter 3). Second, V and Y must be constant during 
the period to which the analysis applied; alternatively they had to respond to changes in 
the money supply alone, and in a predictable way (Meijer 1990: 34).    
 
Most of Friedman’s findings relied upon empirical correlations between M and PY to 
support his claims for the quantity theory equation. However, since correlations can tell 
us nothing about causation, many economists were reluctant to accept this empirical 
‘evidence’.  In reality, central banks did not implement Friedman’s monetary growth rule. 
Friedman (1984: 382) recognised this: ‘…the changes to monetary policy initiated by the 
Thatcher and Reagan governments may certainly be described as an experiment, but not a 
monetarist experiment.’ Friedman and other monetarists refused to classify this episode 
as a monetarist experiment because neither the Bank of England nor the Federal Reserve 
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attempted to fix the quantity of money or control its rate of growth in a steady and 
predictable manner. 
 
Although central banks never implemented a monetary growth rule, they did implement a 
monetary targeting strategy. In a monetary targeting framework, the interest rate is used 
as the operational variable in order to achieve pre-determined monetary targets in pursuit 
of price stability. For instance, if inflation was increasing, the central bank would 
increase short-term interest rates in order to reduce the demand for money. In a modern 
credit economy the supply of money is demand determined (a view shared by the Post 
Keynesians). Thus, a reduction in the demand for money was intended to result in a 
proportionate reduction in the supply of money and therefore prices. In order to achieve 
money supply targets it was assumed that the demand for money was a stable function of 
the interest rate. Empirical studies by Eichner (1986: 65-72), however, showed that an 
uncertainty about the stability of the demand for money existed, indicating a lack of 
conclusive proof that the demand for money is inversely related to the rate of interest. 
 
In order for monetary targeting to be implemented successfully, the central bank must be 
able to control the money supply. Moore (1988b: 373) argued that pro-active control of 
the money supply was hardly possible in economies with credit-money because neither 
the central bank nor the commercial banks knew when borrowers were going to utilise 
their available lines of credit. In South Africa, the authorities’ inability to control the 
money supply was compounded by the impact on domestic monetary aggregates of the 
integration of the financial system in global financial markets. As a result, most central 
banks concluded that it was largely the behaviour of the private sector that determined the 
rate of growth in the money supply. In other words, the money supply was endogenous 
and could not be controlled by the monetary authorities. The inability of the central banks 
to control the money supply was therefore one of the main reasons why monetary 
targeting fell into disrepute and was subsequently abandoned. 
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Implications for interest rate policy 
 
As mentioned earlier, the monetary growth rule was supposed to be implemented by 
controlling the monetary base and allowing interest rates to be truly market determined. 
Friedman (1984: 382) himself acknowledged that this rule was never implemented. This 
implied that interest rates were never truly market determined. Stals, albeit indirectly, 
supported this notion by arguing that by  
 
managing the amount of liquidity that the Reserve Bank is prepared to provide to 
banking institutions, the monetary authorities maintain an important influence on 
the level of interest rates, and therefore on the amount of bank credit extension, 
and on the money supply. Interest rates therefore serve as the main operational 
variable of monetary policy (Stals 1999: 43) (my own emphasis). 
 
In a monetary targeting framework, interest rates are the policy variable that central 
banks use in the pursuit of their monetary target objective. In such a system interest rates 
are exogenous and cannot be said to be determined by the market (Chapter 2). For 
instance, if the actual growth in the monetary aggregate that was targeted (in South 
Africa M3 was the target variable) fell below its target range, then the central bank would 
lower short-term interest rates to push the growth in the monetary aggregate back into the 
target range. On the other hand, if the actual growth in the monetary aggregate was too 
high, the central bank would raise short term interest rates in an attempt to force its 
growth back into the target range.  
4.3.5      Inflation targeting  
 
Problems encountered with monetary targeting in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in 
inflation targeting being adopted in a number of countries in the 1990s11.  The inflation-
targeting framework was first adopted in New Zealand in 1990, followed by Canada in 
February 1991, Israel in December 1991, the United Kingdom in 1992, Sweden and 
Finland in 1993 and Australia and Spain in 1994. The motives for the adoption of 
inflation targeting have varied considerably from country to country. In some countries, 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion of the problems encountered with the monetary targeting framework, see 
Mishkin 2000: 7-15. 
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such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, the collapse of their exchange rates led to 
inflation targeting in an attempt to assure the public that monetary policy would remain 
disciplined. Other countries, such as Canada and South Africa, introduced inflation 
targeting because of problems experienced with the targeting of monetary aggregates 
(Mishkin 2000: 6-7). 
 
Inflation targeting can be defined as:  
 
a monetary policy framework aimed at facilitating the reduction of the inflation 
rate or the maintenance of price stability. It is a framework for anchoring inflation 
expectations’ (SARB 2001a: 3).  
 
 
The case for inflation targeting begins with the premise that the main goal of monetary 
policy in any country must be to attain and preserve a low and stable rate of inflation. 
Although this premise was the subject of controversy among economists not too long 
ago, Masson (1998:1-4) argues that it has since been widely accepted because of a 
general agreement on the following four basic propositions: 
 
First, an increase in the money supply is neutral in the medium to long run. This means 
that money supply increases have lasting effects on the price level only, not on output or 
employment.  
 
Second, high and variable inflation is costly, in terms of either the allocation of resources 
or long-run growth in output, or both.  
 
Third, money is not neutral in the short run. In other words, monetary policy has 
important transitory effects on a number of real variables, including output and 
unemployment. There is, however, still an imperfect understanding of the nature and size 
of these effects, their time frame, and the means by which monetary impulses are 
transmitted to the rest of the economy (the so-called ‘black box’ of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism).  
 
 
 
56
Finally, monetary policy affects the rate of inflation with lags of uncertain duration and 
varying strength. These lags make it difficult, if not impossible, for the central bank to 
control inflation on a period-by-period basis.  
 
The difference between inflation targeting and other frameworks is that inflation 
targeting makes forecasting explicit and more transparent. By adopting a forward- looking 
approach, inflation targeting is intended to allow monetary policy to reduce volatility in 
business activity and smooth the growth trend (SARB 2001a: 4). 
 
Inflation targeting as a policy framework has a number of benefits: it allows the monetary 
authorities to use all available information, not just one variable, to determine the best 
settings for monetary policy. The public easily understands inflation targets and the 
framework thus improves monetary policy credibility. It also has the potential to reduce 
the likelihood that central bank will fall into the time- inconsistency12 trap. Inflation 
targets are also flexible when the target is a range instead of a number. Finally, this 
transparency and communication with the public leads to accountability (Svensson 1999). 
 
Inflation targeting is no panacea. Numerous criticisms have been levelled at this 
framework: first, inflation expectations do not adjust immediately and inflation is not 
easily controlled. Second, inflation targeting may lead to low and unstable growth in 
output and employment. Finally, eliminating inflation is costly and building the central 
bank’s reputation takes time. 
 
The role of interest rates in an inflation-targeting framework  
 
In a monetary targeting framework, the interest rate is used to affect the demand for 
money, which in turn affects the supply of money and therefore inflation. This 
transmission mechanism assumes a stable money demand relationship. Inflation targeting 
models by contrast, do not even include a money demand function. The mechanism 
                                                 
12 The time -inconsistency trap occurs when the central bank reacts to a problem at the wrong time. 
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whereby interest rate changes are transmitted to the rest of the economy can be described 
as follows (Mboweni 2002): 
 
§ Interest rate channel: An increase (reduction) in the repo rate 
influences other financial market interest rates. Firms and 
individuals respond to this change by lowering (increasing) their 
expenditure patterns. This lower (higher) level of demand affects 
output and will eventually feed through to lower (higher) rates of 
inflation. This channel can be summarised as follows: 
 
¯ repo rate ®  ¯interest rates ®  (­I, ­C) ® ­ y ® ­ prices 
             or  ­ repo rate® ­ interest rates ® (¯I,  ¯C) ® ¯ y ® ¯ prices 
 
§ Exchange rate channel: Rising interest rates are normally 
associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate. This could 
also attract foreign investment in the form of a capital inflow. An 
appreciation of the domestic currency (DC) tends to lower the 
price of imports thus contributing towards a lower (imported) 
inflation: 
 
    ­ repo rate ® ­ interest rates ®­ DC ®  ¯ price of imports 
                    or  ¯ repo rate ® ¯interest rates ® ¯DC ®   ­ price of imports 
 
 
§ Money and credit channel: Increased levels of interest rates 
usually lower the demand for domestic credit. Lower credit 
extension and money supply will decrease domestic demand and, 
with a time lag, inflation. 
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§ Inflation expectations: Rising levels of interest rates tend to 
lower future expectations of inflation. These will in turn lower 
unit labour cost and inflation over the longer term. 
 
A notable difference between inflation targeting and the other monetary policy 
frameworks is the decision-making process. As mentioned earlier, one of the features of 
an inflation targeting framework is a greater degree of transparency. Because inflation 
targeting is a forward- looking process, the central bank must convey a credible inflation 
target to the public in order to provide a reliable anchor for inflation expectations 
(Mboweni 2001:1). Greater transparency means that the central bank has to become more 
accountable for its actions to the public. 
 
Previous governors of the SARB were notorious for making decisions without consulting 
a committee. Stals for example, was accused of running a ‘one-man-show’ during his 
governorship (The Citizen 15 October 1999: 31). Stals’s predecessor, Gerhard de Kock, 
also played an important role in monetary policy decisions, although his decisions were 
often marred by political interference.  
  
Unilateral decisions may have been appropriate in previous monetary policy frameworks, 
but in an inflation-targeting framework, they lack the accountability necessary for the 
Reserve Bank to convey a credible inflation target. A more effective platform for the 
explanation of its decisions is needed. In South Africa, this platform was provided by 
Governor Mboweni’s appointment of a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). By having a 
committee rather than an individual making interest rate decisions, it is more difficult for 
a single individual to dominate proceedings and decisions are also less likely to be 
politically motivated:  
 
When the SARB is instructed to aim at an inflation target it has been 
mandated or instructed to aim at by the (democratically elected) 
government of the day, its decisions become technical rather than 
political ones, to be taken by technicians and technocrats rather than 
by politicians as guardians of the public weal. In accounting for its 
policy actions the Reserve Bank will then have to explain them (in 
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technical terms of their presumed effect on the forecasted inflation 
rate), rather than to justify them (Meijer 2000:20). 
 
The Monetary Policy Committee’s decision-making process and the factors taken into 
account when determining short-term interest rates will be described in Chapter 4. 
 
4.3.6   Monetary policy without an explicit nominal anchor (‘unconstrained 
discretion’) 
 
This strategy, which Mishkin (2001: 6) calls the ‘just do it’ strategy, alternatively called 
‘unconstrained discretion’  
 
…involves an implicit, but not an explicit nominal anchor in the 
form of an over-riding concern by the central bank to control 
inflation in the long run. In addition, it involves forward-looking 
behaviour in which there is careful monitoring for signs of future 
inflation, coupled with periodic ‘pre-emptive strikes’ by monetary 
policy against the threat of inflation.  
 
This definition implies a long-run commitment to control inflation, but at the same time, 
monetary policy is not anchored by any specific monetary policy objective and this 
allows the central bank to use interest rates in a discretionary manner. The central bank 
may thus target any number of objectives (eg inflation, output or employment) that it 
deems necessary at any given point in time. For example, when there is a recession, the 
central bank can try to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates. In the short run, 
the central bank attempts to smooth out the peaks and valleys in output and employment 
around their long-run growth paths (Mishkin 2001: 7). Interest rate decisions rest with the 
chief executive of the central bank, and it is entirely within his discretion as to what 
policy stance should be adopted. 
  
In recent years, several countries, most notably the United States, have achieved low and 
stable inflation without using an explicit nominal anchor, such as a target for the 
exchange rate, a monetary aggregate target, or an inflation target. The main argument for 
this strategy is its proven success in certain cases. However, most of its main features are 
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basically disadvantages. In particular, its lack of transparency and the appearance of a 
lack of accountability make it appear inconsistent with democratic principles. 
 
The Federal Reserve in the United States has a unique monetary regime in the sense that 
it is able to, and it does, target output and employment at its discretion. This may be seen 
as pragmatic and sensible on the one hand, and inconsistent and lacking credibility on the 
other. One kind of conflict in particular involves deciding which goal should take 
precedence at any given point in time. For example, suppose there is a recession and the 
central bank successfully tries to prevent severe unemployment losses, then such short-
run success could turn into a long-run problem if monetary policy remains expansionary 
for too long, because such a policy stance could trigger inflationary pressures. It is 
therefore important for the central bank to find the balance between its short-term goal of 
stabilisation and its longer-run goal of maintaining lower inflation. 
 
4.4      CONCLUSION 
 
Central banks use short-term interest rates to achieve their macroeconomic goals. Short-
term interest rates are determined exogenously as a policy variable, in accordance with 
the Post Keynesian view explained in Chapter 2. The aim of this chapter was to 
summarise the various frameworks within which interest rate decisions are taken.  
 
Actual interest rate decisions are, however, not necessarily consistent with a particular 
regime or policy framework. In such instances it is necessary to understand the 
motivations of the person(s) respons ible for monetary policy decisions and the various 
factors which impact on the decisions. In the next chapter, the movements in short-term 
interest rates in South Africa, specifically the prime overdraft interest rate, during the 
period 1981-2002 is examined more closely.  
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                                                        CHAPTER 5 
 
       
MOVEMENTS IN PRIME OVERDRAFT RATES IN  
 
                  SOUTH AFRICA, 1981 - 2002 
 
 
5.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter it was emphasised that interest rate decisions are made within a 
specific monetary policy framework or regime. For example, in a monetary targeting 
framework, the central bank alters short-term interest rates in order to control monetary 
aggregates with the ultimate objective of lowering inflation. The determinants of short-
term interest rates in such a framework would thus include all possible causes of changes 
in monetary aggregates. This is what economic theory dictates. 
 
In reality, central banks are often faced with conflicting objectives and even though they 
may subscribe to a particular monetary policy framework – be it inflation, monetary or 
exchange rate targeting or monetary policy without an explicit nominal anchor – their 
policy decisions may not always be consistent with their particular monetary policy 
framework. It is thus necessary to examine the reasons behind each interest rate decision. 
Moreover, each country has its own unique financial system and economic environment 
and due cognisance has to be taken of the particular and changing circumstances in a 
country. In South Africa, for example, exogenous shocks often required interest rate 
changes that did not necessarily accord with the policy framework in operation at the 
time. 
 
This chapter examines the setting of short-term interest rates, specifically prime overdraft 
rates, in South Africa for the period 1981 to 2002. Prime overdraft rates, in turn are 
linked to the rate at which the central bank provides accommodation to the banking 
system. The activities of the central bank therefore have to be investigated. In this chapter 
the policy choices of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB or Reserve Bank) are 
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examined to determine if they were consistent with the principles underlying the 
monetary policy framework within which the decisions were taken. One of the main 
objectives is to determine whether interest rates were set by the Reserve Bank or whether 
they simply reflected economic or market forces.  
 
The period from 1981 to 2002 is subdivided into three main sub-periods, one for each of 
the Reserve Bank governors who served during this period. Each of these sub-periods is 
then sub-divided further on the basis of changes in the monetary policy framework and 
trends in short-term interest rates.  
 
5.2      THE DE KOCK ERA (1981- 1989) 
 
5.2.1      Background 
 
In order to understand movements in prime overdraft interest rates during this period, it is 
necessary to first get an impression of Dr de Kock and his theoretical views and to 
establish a broad overview of the economic climate in which he operated. 
 
Dr Gerhard de Kock served as governor of the SARB from 1 January 1981 to his 
untimely death on 7 August 1989. He also served as Chairman of the Commission of 
Enquiry into the monetary system and monetary policy in South Africa (the De Kock 
Commission) that published its final report in 1985.  
 
The De Kock Commission (1985: 13.7) defined monetary policy as:  
 
all deliberate actions by the monetary authorities to influence 
monetary aggregates, the availability of credit, interest rates and 
exchange rates, with a view to affecting monetary demand, income, 
output, prices and the balance of payments. 
 
 
According to this definition, the goals of monetary policy extend beyond the sole concern 
of long-term price stability to concern with economic stability in general. In other words, 
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short-term interest rates and other monetary variables were regarded as instruments that 
could be used to achieve various policy goals, including not only price stability but also 
general economic stability in the form of growth, employment and balance of payments 
equilibrium. 
 
Prior to the adoption of a formal monetary targeting framework in March 1986, De Kock 
adopted what can be regarded as an ‘eclectic’ approach to monetary policy decisions. 
Although he had ‘unconstrained discretion’ with respect to monetary policy decisions, in 
the sense of not having to consult a committee, such as the present Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC), the SARB did not enjoy full operational independence. As will be 
explained later, he often had to abide by the will of his political ‘masters’.  
 
Political resistance to higher interest rates was a continuing obstacle to the SARB’s 
freedom to vary Bank rate as economic conditions demanded. This in turn led to 
reluctance to reduce rates, since it might have proved difficult to raise them again. The 
SARB looked for ways to ‘depoliticise’ Bank rate, and hoped to do this by ending the 
convention of a fixed link to the commercial banks’ prime overdraft rates. It announced, 
in February 1982, that the banks were free to set their prime rates independently, but 
instead they agreed among themselves to keep the prime rate at around three percentage 
points above Bank rate (Goedhuys 1999: 155).  
 
Interest rate policy changed radically from the 1970s to the 1980s. During the 1970s 
monetary policy was conducted through direct controls on interest rates and bank 
lending, liquid asset requirements and cash reserve requirements. If monetary policy is 
implemented by setting an interest rate (eg Bank rate) and allowing the quantity of money 
to adjust to the interest rate, then it could perhaps be said that monetary policy is being 
implemented in terms of interest rate targets. However, if the central bank simultaneously 
wishes to limit the quantity of money through ‘direct’ controls on the lending activities of 
commercial banks, the policy cannot be described as market-oriented. The control of the 
quantity of money can be achieved, in principle, by increasing the cash or reserve 
requirements of the commercial banks or by imposing credit ceilings, that is, by placing 
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limits on the amount and type of credit that commercial banks can extend to the private 
sector. This approach, described here as interest rate targeting, came to be associated with 
Keynesian economics in the 1970s. 
 
With the increase in inflation during the 1970s, the use of interest rate targets for 
monetary policy fell into disrepute. One difficulty that was obvious to everyone, was that 
under inflationary conditions, nominal interest rate targets were no longer an indication 
of the real cost of borrowing. In an inflationary environment it was not uncommon to 
have both positive nominal interest rates and negative real interest rates. These negative 
real interest rates caused an increase in the demand for credit and therefore an increase in 
the money supply – with obvious implications for inflation. In addition to this, direct 
interest rate controls caused disintermediation problems - with parallel grey markets 
supplying credit outside of the formal banking sector, making monetary aggregates 
increasingly difficult to measure (Calitz et al 1999: 222-226). 
 
The monetarists under Friedman argued that interest rate targeting was an inappropriate 
policy. The monetarist solution was to fix a target for the money supply and allow 
interest rates to find their own market-determined levels. More specifically, monetarists 
recommended a monetary growth rule in terms of which the growth of a narrow monetary 
aggregate is restricted to a predetermined steady rate of growth of the labour force. This 
implied a money supply target rather than an interest rate target. The approach reflects a 
belief in the quantity theory of money and the view that monetary growth is the sole 
cause of inflation. 
 
The monetarist monetary growth rule was never implemented in South Africa (or, for that 
matter, anywhere else). Instead, central bankers set target ranges for the growth of the M3 
monetary aggregate that they then sought to achieve by suitable adjustments of the 
interest rate. Monetary targeting as a framework for monetary policy framework was 
adopted in South Africa in March 1986. The instrument for attaining the target rate of 
growth in the M3 was Bank rate and the SARB’s discount policy was supported by open 
market operations and public debt management. The ultimate objective was to achieve 
 65
price stability by means of a low and stable rate of increase in the money supply. The 
SARB continued to exercise discretion with respect to interest rate decisions and, from 
time to time, allowed the primary objective of price stability to be modified or even 
overridden temporarily by exchange rate and economic growth objectives. Goedhuys 
(1999: 153) has argued that the turbulent conditions of the time (discussed below) made 
such a qualified commitment to monetary targeting inevitable.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the introduction of the monetary targeting framework 
implied a shift in philosophy towards a synthesis of monetarist and Keynesian ideas. The 
De Kock Commission (1985: 173) described the theoretical underpinnings of monetary 
policy at the time as being a blend of ‘conservative Keynesian demand management and 
pragmatic monetarism.’ The pragmatic monetarist element was contained in the 
importance attributed by the Commission to the control of the money supply and the need 
for monetary targeting, whilst the Keynesian element referred to the use of interest rates 
to influence the demand for credit, and, thus, to maintain the selected monetary 
aggregate, M3, within the predetermined target range. 
 
In order to implement monetary targeting successfully, interest rates could no longer be 
targeted or held stable over time, because adjustments to interest rates were required to 
keep the monetary aggregate within the target range. In the South African debate, this 
aspect has been presented in terms of the philosophy of a market-oriented monetary 
policy promoted by the De Kock Commission. In effect, the Commission recommended 
the abolition of direct controls, that is, interest rate controls as well as credit controls. A 
major step forward, according to Strydom (2001: 31-48), was the introduction of a 
managed floating exchange rate system for the rand in early 1979, while monetary policy 
was to rely more on cash reserve requirements and supporting open market operations. 
These reforms allowed interest rates to follow market signals and from 1980 onwards 
interest rates adjusted towards higher levels, signalling a definite break with the rigid 
control system of the 1970s with its bias towards low interest rates (Goedhuys 1999: 
157). 
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De Kock propagated the idea that interest rates had to be allowed to adjust to realistic or 
market-related levels. This did not imply, however, that interest rates were market-
determined (Rogers 1986b: 73). In the 1980s, following the earlier trend in the major 
industrial countries, the SARB attempted to hit monetary targets by manipulating interest 
rates. So, although interest rates were no longer targeted, interest rate adjustments were 
still important for achieving monetary targets.  
 
5.2.2    Economic context 
 
This section provides a broad overview of the economic conditions within which De 
Kock operated during his tenure as Reserve Bank Governor. De Kock took over the reins 
at the SARB in the midst of one of the strongest post-war economic booms with an 
inflation rate that had already been in double digits for seven years. 
 
During the economic boom in the early 1980s (driven, many argue, by the high price of 
gold), the economy was characterised by buoyant domestic demand – as indicated by 
rising gross domestic expenditure that created inflationary pressures (due to capacity 
constraints). De Kock, in an attempt to achieve inflation levels comparable to those of 
South Africa’s major trading partners, raised interest rates in response to these 
inflationary pressures and, as a result, the prime overdraft rate increased from a low of 
9,5 percent on 6 May 1981 to as high as 25 percent on 4 August 1984. Table 5.1 shows 
the movements in the prime rate, as well as other key variables that will be used in the 
analysis of the prime overdraft rate during the De Kock era.  
 
According to De Kock (1981a), interest rate movements depended to a large extent on the 
behaviour of the gold price and overseas interest rate movements. He argued that if 
interest rates came down for the right reasons (because the economy was cooling down or 
because the rate of inflation was falling), then the Reserve Bank supported and 
encouraged the interest rate decline. However, in certain instances, for example in an 
inflationary environment, he argued that it was in the best interest for the economy to 
raise interest rates to reduce the growth in the money supply: 
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The Reserve Bank’s policy is not one of ‘high’ interest rates or ‘low’ 
interest rates but one of ‘realistic and flexible market-related’ 
interest rates resulting from effective control of the money supply. 
Sound money is the prerequisite for optimum growth in South Africa 
(De Kock 1981a: 34). 
 
Gold and other mineral exports therefore had a significant impact on liquidity in the 
financial markets as well as the exchange rate. Increases in the price of gold, Rogers 
(1986b: 72) argued, were equivalent to exogenous increases in the money stock - thereby 
acting as a causal factor in demand-pull inflationary episodes. Since gold accounted (at 
the time) for about half of export earnings, changes in the price of gold had a large impact 
on the current account of the balance of payments and therefore also on the exchange 
rate. The price of gold was particularly volatile in the early 1980s. For example, it 
reached a high of around US $850 dollars in 1980 and subsequently declined to as low as 
US $296 in 1982. These movements had significant macroeconomic effects. With the 
high gold price in 1980 the economy was thriving, recording real GDP growth well above 
5 percent for the year. In 1983, with the gold price tumbling, real GDP shrank by almost 
2 percent.  
 
By the mid-1980s, a declining gold price, sluggish world growth, droughts and political 
upheavals created balance of payments problems. As a result, the exchange rate came 
under severe pressure. According to Mohr (2001: 121), De Kock reacted to these balance 
of payments problems by raising and maintaining high interest rates and permitting 
significant depreciations of the rand against major currencies. For instance, when De 
Kock became governor the prime interest rate was 9,5 percent and a US dollar cost less 
then 75 South African cents. When he died on 7August 1989 the prime rate was 20 
percent and a US dollar cost R2, 72. 
 
Nattrass (1998:169-171) has argued that the trade balance was related to short-term 
interest rates in a way that provides interesting insight into the practice of monetary 
policy during the De Kock era. She argues that the two variables were inversely related in 
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a highly consistent way: when the trade balance deteriorated, interest rates increased, and 
vice versa.  
 
A deficit on the trade account must be financed with foreign exchange. Thus a country’s 
ability to run a consistent trade deficit is limited by the access to foreign capital. For 
various reasons that will be discussed shortly, the foreign financial community was often 
reluctant to provide South Africa with foreign exchange. So as the balance of trade 
deteriorated, and foreigners proved unwilling to supply the shortfall in foreign exchange, 
the SARB regarded the trade deficit as unsustainable. The SARB consequently raised 
interest rates with the intention of reducing the money supply. This reduction was 
intended to dampen spending on imports and to achieve a sustainable balance of 
payments position. 
 
A great deal of South Africa’s economic woes during this period was attributable to 
events on the political front. From 1984 onwards, South Africa increasingly became the 
target of disinvestment campaigns, trade and financial sanctions and boycotts as a result 
of the discriminatory policies embodied in apartheid. South African exports were denied 
access to certain markets, certain essential imports became more difficult and expensive 
to obtain and the net inflow of foreign capital turned into a net outflow. These events 
culminated in a foreign debt crisis in 1985. After protracted negotiations, a debt 
rescheduling agreement was reached with the creditor banks. South Africa’s isolation 
from international financial markets in the following years meant that the authorities had 
to engineer surpluses on the current account of the balance of payments to meet the debt 
repayment commitments. As emphasised by Nattrass (1998: 169-171) this meant that 
relatively high interest rates had to be maintained to stifle domestic demand for imports, 
so as to achieve balance of payments equilibrium.  
 
It should be clear that international developments significantly influenced the 
performance of economic policy during the De Kock era. As mentioned earlier, in a small 
open economy, balance of payments considerations are often an overriding concern, and 
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in the face of unfavourable disturbances, stabilisation policy in South Africa often had to 
be geared to achieving or maintaining external equilibrium.  
 
 
Table 5.1   MOVEMENTS IN KEY VARIABLES DURING THE DE KOCK ERA 
  
 
 
 
Year 
Real 
GDP 
growth  
 
Average 
annual 
increase 
in CPI  
Growth 
in M3  
 
 
Guideline 
range for 
M3  
 
Current 
account 
balance  
 
Financial 
account 
balance  
 
Prime 
overdraft 
rate at 
year end  
   (%) (%)   (%) (%)  (R m)  (R m) (%) 
1981   5,4 15,2 17,26 n/a -4176    744 17,0 
1982 - 0,4 14,7 14,41 n/a -3557  4609 18,0 
1983 - 1,8 12,3 16,42 n/a   -428    135 20,0 
1984   5,1 11,7 17,56 n/a -2517  1151 24,0 
1985  -1,2 16,2 12,25 n/a  5208 -8442 16,5 
1986     0 18,6 10,28 16 - 20  6328 -5285 12,0 
1987   2,1 16,1 12,93 14 - 18  6708 -3564 12,5 
1988   4,2 12,0 25,53 12 - 16  3383 -6863 18,0 
1989   2,4 14,7 24,50 14 - 18  3467 -4704 21,0 
 
Source : SARB Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 
 
 
The picture presented of the South African economy in the 1980s was thus one of gloom 
and decline. The growth rate of GDP in real terms averaged a mere 1,2% per annum. 
Since the population increased much faster than that, real GDP per head fell by no less 
than 13% over the decade. Fixed investment shrank in every year after 1981, discouraged 
by declining profits (Goedhuys 1999: 146). Short of civil war, a worse environment for 
monetary policy could hardly be imagined. So, far from promoting economic growth, or 
even combating inflation, monetary policy had to enforce a painful downward adjustment 
in consumer and investment spending in the private sector to compensate for the rising 
government spending and also produce a current account surplus on the balance of 
payments. It did so by maintaining relatively high interest rates (but eased the pressure in 
1985 to 1987 when the economy could not be depressed further anyway), and by 
 70
permitting a persistent decline in the external value of the currency. Gidlow (1995: 12) 
argued that during De Kock’s tenure  
 
…monetary policy was conducted in a crisis atmosphere for parts of 
the last decade amid persistent financial instability reflected in the 
relatively high inflation rate, and sharp fluctuations in interest rates 
at the time. 
 
5.2.3      Movements in prime interest rates during the De Kock era 
 
February 1981 – December 1982: A period of rising interest rates 
 
During this period, the prime overdraft rate was increased on six occasions. It moved 
from a low of 8 percent on 3 February 1981 to a high of 18 percent at the end of 
December 1982. 
 
De Kock ascribed this period of rising interest rates to ‘natural’ economic forces. These 
include the combination of a lower gold price, worldwide recessionary tendencies and 
continued high overseas interest rates, coupled with a strong demand for credit in the 
buoyant South African economy and the decline in the value of South African exports 
owing to a severe drought. The result was a tightening in the financial markets with the 
resultant rise in interest rates.  
 
Therefore as a matter of policy, the authorities allowed interest rates 
to rise in response to market forces (De Kock 1981a: 25).  
 
At the same time, De Kock argued that the interest rate increases represented an  
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…essential part of the anti- inflationary monetary policy, which was 
aimed at slowing down the excessive expansion of the money supply 
and reducing the pressure of excess demand (ibid).  
 
De Kock’s decision to raise short-term interest rates during this period was explained in 
the context of curbing the excessively high rates of growth in the money supply that had 
become an important intermediate objective of monetary policy in the process of 
reducing the rate of inflation. This is an interesting argument. On the one hand he argued 
that market forces were responsible for the rising interest rates, while on the other hand, 
he admitted to allowing these rates to rise as a deliberate monetary policy decision to 
reduce the rate of growth in the money supply in pursuance of lowering inflation (my 
own emphasis). Were interest rates determined by market forces or was the interest rate a 
policy variable?  De Kock’s motives are confusing. The answer seems to be that he 
responded to market forces when setting interest rates but only so far as they were 
consistent with his policy objectives.  
 
Even if market forces did determine interest rates, it was still the Bank’s decision as a 
‘matter of policy’ to allow the markets to push interest rates up in the first place. The 
Bank appeared to have controlled interest rates in pursuance of its objectives - even if 
controlling interest rates implied allowing the markets to determine their appropriate 
level by deliberately not intervening.  
 
Prior to 1986 De Kock operated within a purely discretionary framework, targeting a 
variety of variables – including growth, inflation and the balance of payments. De Kock’s 
motives for justifying interest rate changes therefore depended on the objective being 
targeted. In line with his promotion of free markets, he was reluctant to admit that the 
Bank was not standing entirely aloof from what was happening in the markets, and that it 
was still playing an important role in the determination of interest rates. The level and 
structure of interest rates cannot be said to have been determined by the market alone, 
especially if supply and demand were influenced by the Bank through open-market 
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operations and other instruments of monetary policy. This view was supported by Rogers 
(1986b: 73) who pointed out that  
 
…it is important not to lose sight of the fact that it is the SARB, and 
not the markets, which determines the level at which interest rates 
are set. 
 
Kantor (1986: 52) underscored this view by arguing that  
 
…the market-oriented interest rates argued for in the Report (1985) 
are not market-determined rates in the usual sense of the term. What 
is recommended is that all interest rates be closely aligned with those 
short-term interest rates controlled directly by the Reserve Bank 
through its more or less continuous interaction with the money 
market, banks and discount houses (my own emphasis). 
 
This argument is closely aligned with the Post-Keynesian emphasis on an exogenously 
determined short-term interest rate. Nel (1994:17) discussed this further by arguing that 
Bank rate being declared market related did not imply that this rate was set by the market, 
but rather that it was set at a level which was seen by the Reserve Bank as appropriate  
 
…in light of trends in the financial markets, the business cycle, 
growth in the money supply, gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
inflation and the exchange rate (ibid). 
 
Schmulow and Greyling (1996:179) also support the notion of interest rate exogeneity in 
their explanation of the mechanics of monetary policy during De Kock’s tenure as 
Reserve Bank governor. They argue that the SARB’s operational variable for seeking to 
manage the rate of monetary expansion, was the level of short-term interest rates; and the 
Bank’s prime instrument for influencing the general interest rate level consisted of 
variations in Bank rate. The interest rates then become exogenous variables and the 
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money supply an endogenous variable, with banking institutions being allowed, or 
forced, to make good a shortfall in their cash reserve holdings by means of 
‘accommodation’ at the SARB’s discount window. The transmission mechanism 
operated with the understanding that as the SARB raised interest rates, so the demand for 
credit would decline. This would then cause the rate of increase in the money supply to 
decline as well. The unfortunate side effect, however, was that economic growth declined 
as interest rates rose, with adverse implications for the domestic financial situation. 
 
December 1982 – March 1983: A period of declining interest rates 
 
During this period the prime overdraft rate was reduced on three occasions. It moved 
from a high of 18 percent in December 1982 to a low of 14 percent on 3 July 1983. 
 
In recognition of the rapid movement in both the current and capital 
account of the balance of payments, the further slowing down of the 
domestic economy and the substantial decline in overseas interest 
rates, the monetary authorities have, as a matter of conscious policy, 
permitted domestic interest rates to decline substantially in response 
to market forces. To that extent, there has been as easing of 
monetary policy as a deliberate contra-cyclical measure (SARB 
1983a: 6, my own emphasis). 
 
Two points are worth mentioning here. First, as mentioned earlier, the fact that the 
monetary authorities were ‘deliberately’ allowing interest rates to decline ‘…as a matter 
of conscious policy…’ implied that interest rate movements were managed as a policy 
variable (ie determined exogenously). Second, these interest rates were supposedly 
realistic in the sense that they were responding to ‘market forces’. This does not imply, 
however, that they were determined by the market.  
 
The Bank’s statement that it ‘…permitted domestic interest rates to decline substantially 
in response to market forces’ (ibid) is particularly dubious in light of the political 
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pressure faced by the Bank in February 1983 (this was not mentioned in any of the SARB 
Quarterly Bulletins), when the ruling National Party faced a serious challenge from the 
Conservative Party in the by-election in the Primrose district of Germiston. The Bank 
was induced (if not forced) to lower its discount rate from 12,81 percent to 10,06 percent. 
The following month it raised the rate again to 12,04 percent. This temporary low 
discount rate, reflected also in the prime rate, came to be known as the ‘Primrose prime’, 
and it helped to retain the Primrose seat for the National Party (Goedhuys 1999: 146). 
 
From an analytical perspective, it is difficult to see how the Bank was able to argue in 
favour of an interest rate reduction caused by market forces – when in fact it was being 
coerced into setting a specific level for the prime for political reasons! Interest rate 
decisions were not always in the hands of the Bank or De Kock. Politically motivated 
decisions render an analysis of the determinants of short-term interest rates in the context 
of any specific monetary policy framework extremely difficult. Nevertheless, any 
analysis of the determinants of short-term interest rates prior to the Reserve Bank being 
given constitutional independence has to account for politically motivated decisions. 
 
Nel (1994: 25) summarised the difficulties De Kock experienced in implementing 
monetary policy quite succinctly by arguing that  
 
…in the De Kock era it was especially difficult to walk this 
(political) tight rope. The usual problems around domestic monetary 
control, the balance of payments and the rate of exchange were 
compounded by the demands of politicians embroiled in the 
financing of ill-conceived schemes at home, answering to the 
increasing demands of homelands governments, and waging a full 
scale war in Angola. 
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June 1983 – August 1984: A period of rising interest rates 
 
This period saw a dramatic increase in the prime overdraft rate. The prime rate was 
increased eleven times in this fourteen-month period, from 14 percent on 20 June 1983 to 
25 percent on 4 August 1984. 
 
A number of economic events impacted on the path of interest rates during this period. A 
short- lived ‘mini-boom’ occurred between March 1983 and the middle of 1984, and 
helped to create excess demand, which the Bank believed to require strong corrective 
measures. The increase in the gold price from the middle of 1982 and a higher level of 
interest rates than that prevailing overseas resulted in the abolition of the financial rand 
(tantamount to the lifting of exchange control on non-residents) in February 1983. The 
result was a net inflow of capital, stimulated by the higher gold price, and this in turn 
helped to fuel the demand for assets, both real and financial. The rand appreciated against 
the major currencies until July 1983, despite a sharp fall in the price of gold in February, 
but then entered a phase of almost continuous depreciation (SARB 1983: 5-7). 
 
The drought that began in 1983 intensified and became more damaging to the economy. 
Maize exports were replaced by maize imports. The gold price continued its slide 
throughout 1984, with domestic demand, including the demand for imports, remaining 
buoyant, resulting in deficits on the current account of the balance of payments during the 
third quarter of 1983 and throughout the first three quarters of 1984. The rand continued 
to depreciate against the major currencies. 
 
De Kock justified his decision to increase interest rates on the basis of the notably higher 
rate of increase in the money supply (see Table 5.1), a sharp decline in the price of gold 
and its effect on the net foreign reserves and on liquidity in general and, finally, the 
impact of increasing domestic demand, including its effect on the level of imports (SARB 
1984: 8). 
 
The interest rate adjustments during this period were regarded as necessary to  
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…strengthen the balance of payments and the external value of the 
rand and to lower the rate of inflation, all with the view of sustaining 
growth in the longer-term (De Kock 1984a: 23).  
 
De Kock thus argued that the restrictive monetary policy was aimed at slowing down the 
rate of increase in the money supply and total spending in order to prevent undue 
depreciation of the rand and a further increase in the rate of inflation. 
 
In a small open economy such as that of South Africa, which is dependent on imported 
capital and intermediate goods and in which exports account for about one third of its 
GDP, the balance of payments has often been an overriding consideration. In fact, it has 
frequently been argued that  
 
…balance of payments stability should be viewed as a constraint, 
rather than a policy objective. In other words, if a serious balance of 
payments deficit occurred, economic policy simply had to be geared 
to the elimination of this deficit (Calitz et al 1999: 172).  
 
The impact of the balance of payments was clearly illustrated during this period of high 
and increasing interest rates. 
 
The need to maintain a relatively high rate of interest for balance of payments purposes 
was by no means costless. There were inevitably going to be tradeoffs – the rate of real 
economic growth slowed down and inflation rose (see Table 5.1). De Kock was severely 
criticised by many during this period for implementing a policy of high interest rates. For 
example, Botha (1997: 535) argued  
 
…that it is one of the conundrums of the South African monetary 
scene that it is difficult to reconcile the circumspect reasoning 
around the question of interest- inelasticity with the policies that the 
Reserve Bank has adopted since the early 1980s. The facts show that 
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the money supply is fundamentally unrelated to the level of the rate 
of interest…the facts show the relationship between the money 
supply and the rate of interest is not nearly as close and sensitive as 
De Kock has made it out. 
 
He argued further that the Bank persistently overemphasised the role played by the rate of 
interest in stimulating or slowing down the pace of the economy and, internationally, in 
attracting investment capital from abroad:  
 
South Africa’s sluggish growth, characterised by high levels of 
unemployment while at the same time having high growth potential 
called for  low interest rates - not the unrealistically high rates that 
the country had been wrestling with since 1980. The SARB is 
adamant that the high rates are needed to keep inflation and the 
money supply in check, and that any lowering of the rate would 
aggravate inflation and cause the money supply to rise beyond 
control - the rate of credit creation in the South African economy has 
been singularly unaffected by the level of interest rates over a long 
period of time (Botha 1997: 536).  
 
From this argument, he concluded that there was no evidence to assert tha t De Kock’s 
views were correct. 
 
Nel (1994: 17-19), like Botha (1986: 41-54) found no clear relationship between the 
money supply and interest rates. Botha’s studies showed that enormous increases in 
interest rates were accompanied by correspondingly high increases in monetary 
aggregates over an extended period. Botha thus accused De Kock of adopting a static, 
first-year textbook view of interest rate policy: 
 
The interest rate policy of the Bank, based upon the narrow 
interpretation of the dynamics of interest rates, greatly intensified the 
economic misery experienced by the farming community, small 
businessmen and home-owners of this country during the second 
half of 1984 and most of 1985. This policy does not reflect 
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positively on the professional competence on the part of the Bank 
(Botha 1986: 38). 
 
May 1985 – December 1986: A period of declining interest rates  
 
During this period, the prime overdraft rate was reduced on thirteen occasions. The 
prime rate was reduced from a high of 25 percent on 6 May 1985 to a low of 12 percent 
on 24 December 1986.  
 
In 1985 the rate of increase in the growth of monetary aggregates declined substantially. 
It seems that the prohibitively high interest rates in the 1984 period had, to some extent, 
achieved their objective of stifling the demand for credit. Major developments also 
occurred on the political front. Socio-political unrest began in 1984. The infamous 
Rubicon speech by the then State President P.W. Botha, followed by the declaration of a 
state of emergency, played havoc with the foreign exchange market, as manifested in 
volatile capital movements, and leads and lags in terms of import and export payments 
(SARB 1986: 5-7). 
 
On 1 September 1985 a ‘standstill’ in respect of a large portion of South Africa’s debt 
was declared and exchange controls over non-residents in the form of the financial rand 
were reintroduced. South Africa also imposed payment restrictions on its foreign debt 
when certain foreign banks (mainly in the United States) refused to roll over short-term 
loans (Strydom 2001: 36). The rand began depreciating sharply as a result of the massive 
capital outflows on the capital account of the balance of payments induced by these 
political problems. This had serious implications for inflation that shot up to 16,2 percent 
in 1985 (see Table 5.1) from the previous year’s level of 11,7 percent. 
 
After mid-1985, monetary policy operated continuously under the shadow of the foreign 
debt problem. The economy had become hostage to the capital account as South Africa 
faced a ‘unilateral transfer problem’ (Goedhuys 1999:162). Huge surpluses on the current 
account had to be generated in the face of sanctions and boycotts, to finance the capital 
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outflow in each year from 1984 onwards. High interest rates in 1984 and 1985 and 
continuous rand depreciations were the means employed. 
 
Despite the unfavourable political developments and the resultant moratorium on debt 
repayments, the SARB continued with its policy of leading interest rates downwards by a 
series of orderly reductions in Bank Rate. The Bank took the view that the new 
depreciation of the rand and the persistent high rate of inflation after July were mainly the 
result of non-economic developments and not of overspending or unduly low interest 
rates. In these circumstances, and given the recessionary conditions in the large sections 
of the economy, the  
 
…Bank deemed it necessary to contribute to the utilisation of the 
scope existing in the economy for increased spending and output, 
rather than attempt to strengthen the rand through raising interest 
rates and applying classical deflation in general (De Kock 1985: 20).  
 
 
This policy choice implies that a shift of priorities had occurred from combating inflation 
to the promotion of growth and employment. 
 
Prior to the introduction of a formal monetary targeting framework on the 17th of March 
1986, De Kock had a considerable amount of discretion with respect to monetary policy 
decisions, although his overall goal was to ensure low levels of inflation. By operating 
within a pragmatic monetary targeting framework, De Kock was able to manipulate 
interest rates for controlling other variables besides monetary aggregates - in this 
situation he targeted growth and employment through a policy of maintaining low interest 
rates. De Kock could just as easily have raised short-term interest rates in light of the fact 
that inflation was still a problem – yet he decided that the causes of inflation at the time 
were not related to demand. He therefore consciously made the policy decision to lower 
interest rates. This reinforces the view that De Kock acted in a way that was more 
theoretically aligned with the Keynesian view than a monetarist view. 
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Rogers (1985: 241-247) supported this explanation when he evaluated the Reserve 
Bank’s monetary control procedures and found that they were incompatible with 
monetarism but compatible with Post Keynesian monetary theory. He argued that 
monetary policy during De Kock’s tenure should not be described as a variety of 
monetarism:  
 
The SARB is simply following the fashion established by other 
central banks. Central banks around the world implicitly employ a 
Post Keynesian analysis of the money supply even though they 
present a policy of monetary targeting as monetarist!(Rogers 1985: 
238).  
 
 
He concluded by arguing that central banks did not implement monetary base control as 
called for by the monetarists. The reason is that an endogenously determined money 
supply is consistent with the world in which central banks operate, but the monetarist 
approach is not. Rogers argued that pragmatic ‘monetarism’ was therefore a misnomer. 
 
Policy change: The introduction of a monetary targeting framework  
 
The SARB formally adopted a monetary targeting framework on 17 March 1986. The 
objective was the pursuit of price stability by means of a low and stable rate of increase 
in the money supply. The SARB chose M3 as a comprehensive monetary aggregate that 
could serve as an intermediate target in attempts to control inflation. The instrument 
variable for attaining the target was Bank rate, which was influenced, in turn, by the 
market-oriented methods of discount policy, open market operations and public debt 
management.  
 
The SARB, under Gerhard de Kock, did not regard its monetary policy as a rigidly 
determined monetary rule along the lines of monetarist thinking. De Kock continued to 
exercise a fair amount of discretion with respect to interest rate decisions. From time to 
time, he still allowed the primary objective of price stability to be overridden by 
exchange rate and economic growth objectives. 
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With the introduction of the monetary targeting framework, Bank rate (ie the SARB’s 
discount rate for liquid assets) was (re-)established as the pivotal instrument of monetary 
policy. This required several years of prior reform. Before December 1983, the SARB 
applied a discount rate at a fixed spread above market rates for the assets concerned, 
which meant that it followed rather than led the market, but after that date it quoted rates 
that it determined according to the type of asset tendered, and that were higher for banks 
than for discount houses until February 1989 (Goedhuys 1999: 153). 
 
The relationship between Bank rate and the prime overdraft interest rate was studied by 
Botha (1997: 532-567). He argued that Bank rate and the prime overdraft interest rate had 
always been key elements of monetary control in South Africa, as the latter served as an 
important guideline in the determination of interest rates on several credit instruments in 
the financial markets. On 16 February 1982, the SARB abandoned the link between the 
two variables. As could be expected, this resulted in a decrease in the correlation between 
the two for the period 1983-1987. During 1983 this gap was particularly unstable and 
varied between 3,5 and 5,5 percentage points. In 1984 it was more stable, in the 2,25 to 
3,25 percentage point range. In 1985 it was stable at 3,5 percentage points. After 1986 the 
course of the prime overdraft rate once again became closer to that of Bank rate. This 
occurred in an environment where the two rates were not formally or semi-formally 
linked. 
 
A detailed theoretical exposition of the way in which the SARB controlled Bank rate, 
thereby establishing influence over money market interest rates, is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, but may be found in the analysis by Whittaker and Theunissen (1987). 
The developments in the money market accommodation procedures of the SARB are 
contained in the analysis undertaken by Meijer (1991: 135-142). 
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January 1987 – October 1989: An extended period of rising interest rates 
 
The prime overdraft rate was increased on eleven occasions during this period. It 
increased from a low of 12 percent on 24 December 1986 to a high of 21 percent on 11 
October 1989. 
 
Improved domestic economic conditions in early 1988 saw domestic demand creating 
demand pressures for both inflation and the current account of the balance of payments 
(through increases in the demand for imports). The improvement in the overall economic 
conditions manifested itself in the form of burgeoning growth rates (see Table 5.1).  
 
The strengthening of the economy also resulted in sharp increases in the demand for 
credit, indicated by a marked acceleration in the growth rate of the money supply. As a 
result, M3 overshot its targets for both 1988 and 1989. The SARB made it clear that  
 
…it did not intend to force M3 back into its target range as this 
would have an unduly contractionary effect on the economy (SARB 
1988: 4). 
 
 
The SARB believed that the  
 
…stricter monetary policy now being applied and the return to 
interest rate levels that are materially positive in real terms should 
contribute in a fundamental way to the strengthening of the balance 
of payments and the exchange rate value of the rand in the period 
ahead (SARB 1988: 5).  
 
 
Interest rate policy was thus implemented in order to achieve balance of payments 
objectives.  
 
During his tenure, De Kock switched between inflation, balance of payments, exchange 
rate, growth and monetary target objectives. These policy objectives occasionally 
clashed. In particular, a notable clash over interest rate policy occurred in early 1988. 
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During the preceding two years, the SARB had advisedly adopted a low interest policy, 
because under foreign financial and trade sanctions business was so depressed that the 
risk of over-stimulating the economy was remote. By 1988, however, continued inflation, 
some business revival, and the low foreign reserves urgently demanded higher interest 
rates, but the State President absolutely forbade it in order to ward off the electoral threat 
of the Conservative Party (Goedhuys 1999: 86). Political interference once again 
impacted on the course of short-term interest rates. De Kock was well aware of the 
dangers of politically motivated monetary policy decisions. He warned constantly of how 
politics was impinging on the well being of the economy, and urged reform. The refusal 
of the cabinet, for political reasons, to allow interest rates to rise was a great weight that 
De Kock had to bear. It frustrated his control of the money supply – which shot out of its 
target range, boosted by the provision of too cheap forward cover. It undermined the 
currency, misallocated resources, fuelled inflation, cut savings and choked off 
investment. It essentially fostered stagflation – low growth and high inflation (Financial 
Mail, 11 August 1989: 32). Movements in short-term interest rates during this period 
were governed by policy choice (both economic and political) and not, as De Kock would 
have us believe, by market forces. 
 
5.2.4      Concluding remarks on the De Kock era 
 
It may appear that we have been particularly critical of De Kock and his policies. In all 
fairness, it should be recognised that this was possibly the most difficult decade in the 
history of the SARB, operating as it did in the face of widespread international hostility 
and growing resistance to the consequences of the economic and racial policies of the 
government at the time. In spite of these unfavourable domestic and international 
conditions, a variety of often far-reaching institutional reforms were implemented in the 
1980s. According to Goedhuys (1999: 147), the  
 
…enduring achievement of the De Kock era is the reform of the 
institutions and methods of monetary management in both its 
domestic and external aspects.  
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In order to draw any conclusions of the type of monetary policy applied in this era and 
about the determinants of interest rates in particular, it is necessary to understand the 
SARB’s theoretical view and to analyse the various policy choices. The monetary policy 
framework applied during most of the 1980s was defined by the De Kock Commission 
(1985: A13) as being a blend of ‘conservative Keynesian demand management and 
pragmatic monetarism.’ What precisely did this mean? Economists have conflicting 
explanations. Strydom (1991) claimed that the widely fluctuating and unstable pattern of 
interest rates was probably best explained by the major contradictions that characterised 
monetary policy during this period:  
 
The monetary authorities applied a Keynesian approach but flirted 
with monetarism and displayed little understanding for the 
fundamental conflicting elements underlying these two approaches 
(Strydom 1991: 375).  
 
 
This statement is supported by the following somewhat conflicting views over the precise 
meaning of the theoretical framework the SARB claimed to have been operating within. 
 
Calitz et al (1999: 222-226) argue that the pragmatic monetarist element was contained in 
the importance attributed by the Commission to the control of the money supply and the 
need for monetary targeting, whilst the Keynesian element was perceived in the use of 
interest rates to influence the demand for credit, and, thus, to maintain the selected 
monetary aggregate, M3, within the predetermined target range.  
 
This synthesis between Keynesian demand management and 
pragmatic monetarism reflects the Keynesian-monetarist synthesis 
which has occurred at the level of theory, and which, to some extent 
at least, provides the eclectic basis in terms of which monetary 
policy is assessed (Calitz et al 1999: 223). 
 
Rogers (1986b: 67), on the other hand, felt that, from an analytical perspective this blend 
of ‘conservative Keynesian demand management and pragmatic monetarism’ obscured 
more than it revealed. He argued that from the point of view of monetary policy, the 
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monetarist element should be identified with the influence of the gold price on the money 
stock and not on the monetary targeting framework per se, with the Keynesian element 
being associated with the behaviour of the domestic banking system.  
 
In an attempt to clear up this confusion, it would perhaps be best to recap the defining 
characteristics of each school of thought. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the defining 
feature of monetarism is the quantity theory of money. The traditional quantity theory is 
used to justify the argument for a fixed monetary growth rule as a centrepiece of 
monetarist doctrine. This monetarist doctrine was based upon Friedman’s belief that a 
100 percent reserve ratio banking system would impose some of the stability properties 
of the classical quantity theory of money on the domestic price level and prevent any cost 
shocks from initiating the inflationary process. With the domestic price level anchored by 
a fixed or slowly growing money supply – in terms of the money growth rule – inflation 
would increase in direct proportion to this fixed increase in the growth of money supply. 
 
The Post Keynesians reject this analysis on the grounds that it reflects a gross 
misunderstanding or misspecification of the money supply process in an economy with a 
modern banking system (as explained in Chapter 3). They argue that, in such a system, 
Bank rate is a key exogenous variable and is thus not market determined. In recognising 
this, they implicitly accept the notion that the money supply cannot be controlled as an 
exogenous variable, and is therefore largely endogenous. 
 
Meijer (1984: 12) outlined the monetary control system employed by the SARB during 
the 1980s:  
An inspection of the description of these procedures reveals that they 
are comparable with Post Keynesian monetary theory but 
incompatible with monetarism. 
 
In particular, he argued that the SARB’s monetary control measures were inconsistent 
with the quantity theory of money. For instance, Meijer (1984: 11) explained:  
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…finally and most significantly, the money supply and its rate of 
growth now have become more explicitly demand determined at the 
general level of interest rates as influenced by the authorities 
discount policies and supporting actions in the financial markets.  
 
Many years later, the endogenous nature of the money supply was recognised explicitly 
by the SARB:  
…the money supply in South Africa is largely demand determined 
(SARB 1997: 35). 
 
Under these conditions, the traditional quantity theory breaks down, as the direction of 
causation is no longer unidirectional, from MV to PT, as in the quantity equation    
(remembering from Chapter 2, that one of the most important assumptions underlying the 
quantity theory is that the money supply must be exogenous and therefore independent of 
changes in V, P or Y). In other words, the evolution of the banking system opened up the 
possibility of reverse causation because it eliminated, or at least considerably limited, the 
existence of an independent, exogenously determined money supply function.  
 
There is therefore nothing remotely monetarist about the SARB’s 
monetary control system (Rogers 1986b: 79). 
 
In effect, the SARB’s monetary control system, although it included a commitment to 
monetary targeting, suggested that the cornerstone of monetarism – the quantity theory of 
money – was rejected in favour of a Post Keynesian approach to monetary control. The 
SARB’s exogenous Bank rate was the key operational variable used to control the 
demand for money and thus, indirectly, to maintain the rate of monetary growth within 
the SARB’s pre-determined monetary targets or guidelines.  
 
 87
From the earlier discussion it is apparent that De Kock’s rhetoric differed from what he 
was practising. When the quantitative controls were reduced in the late 1970s and 
abolished in the early 1980s, the SARB was left with the qualitative weapon of interest 
rates plus the quantitative control of open market operations and public debt 
management. De Kock vehemently denied that the Bank was fixing either the level or the 
structure of interest rates. He argued that a rise in market interest rates was 
 
…essentially a consequence of the decision to curb the creation of 
credit as an absolute prerequisite for controlling the money supply 
and total spending (De Kock 1988: 31). 
 
De Kock often stressed that the SARB had a money supply target and not an interest rate 
target. In order to curb the money supply, the SARB had to curb banks’ credit. And to do 
that, the SARB had to curb its own creation of cash reserves for the banks. And when the 
SARB did that at a time when economic activity was vigorous and the demand for credit 
high, normal market forces would raise short-term interest rates. In his words,  
 
…if something is made scarcer, it is only logical that its price should 
rise (De Kock 1988: 31). 
 
Furthermore, he emphasised that 
 
…the rate of interest is not an ‘administered’ price to be determined 
by either the government or the SARB like the price of maize or 
railway tariffs. There is not one interest rate but dozens of interest 
rates or yields. They normally fluctuate daily in response to changes 
in demand and supply in the relevant financial markets... But neither 
the government nor the SARB sets either the level or the structure of 
interest rates in the manner in which ‘administered’ prices are 
determined (De Kock 1998: 31). 
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For this reason, De Kock argued that short-term interest rates were determined by market 
forces and were ‘market related’ in the sense that the SARB followed the market in 
setting its rates.  
 
However, when there was a deliberate shift in monetary policy objectives, for instance in 
the 1985 – 1986 period where interest rates were reduced deliberately to promote growth 
at the expense of inflation, it becomes difficult to justify De Kock’s assertion that interest 
rates were determined by market forces. If short-term rates were indeed determined by 
the market, the SARB could be expected to align itself to market developments and allow 
interest rates to respond to the high level of inflation by raising interest rates – not 
dropping them.  
 
If the market alone determined interest rates, it would mean that the SARB would 
logically surrender its control function to the market, with open market operations 
remaining as the only means of influencing the money supply. This was not the case. In 
reality, market participants kept a watchful eye on the interest rate policy of the SARB. 
The interest rate (Bank rate) was fixed by the Bank and functioned in the market as the 
anchor rate, which then affected the structure of interest rates on papers of various 
maturities and risks. This left the SARB as the major player in field. Interest rates were 
determined exogenously as a policy variable and the type of monetary policy applied 
during this period was consistent with the Post Keynesian theoretical framework.  
5.3      THE STALS ERA (1989 –1999) 
5.3.1      Background 
 
Dr Chris Stals succeeded Gerhard de Kock on 8 August 1989. He served as Governor for 
a full ten-year period, until August 1999.  Stals firmly supported monetary discipline and 
made it clear from the outset that he was determined to reduce the inflation rate to 
significantly lower levels. In some ways the philosophy of monetary policy did not 
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appear to change with the appointment of Dr Stals as Reserve Bank Governor. He 
described his philosophy as a  
 
…‘monetarist’ approach based on the direct control of the money 
supply. South Africa…introduced money supply targeting as an 
anchor for monetary policy during the course of the 1980s (Stals 
1997b: 36). 
 
A strict monetary policy path was also pursued throughout the 1990s, aimed at  
 
…the protection of the domestic and external value of the rand (Stals 
1993a: 31).  
 
In official statements on monetary policy, the lowering of the inflation rate was accorded 
the highest priority, but the low levels of foreign exchange reserves in fact often forced 
the Reserve Bank to apply a restrictive policy. The exchange rate of the rand also 
featured as an important anchor for monetary policy. 
 
Stals was committed to keeping inflation low, but was equally committed to ensuring 
balance of payments stability. He stated that  
 
South Africa learned from the bitter experience of 1985 that a 
country that allows a balance of payments problem to develop to a 
point where it can no longer be managed pays a high price in terms 
of lost international credibility for its failure. Corrective action is 
therefore necessary at an early stage, which may even at times, 
require the abortion of an economic upswing in its infancy (Stals 
1993b: 30).  
 
In addition, he argued that 
 
 …the balance of payments remains a sensitive regulator that will 
always serve as a reminder to ourselves of our own economic 
limitations. No nation can live beyond its means for any lengthy 
period of time without running into an external economic problem. 
The balance of payments therefore serves as a sensitive disciplinary 
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force on all countries and as a constant reminder that there is no 
alternative for hard work (Stals 1993b: 28). 
 
It is difficult to determine in what order the objectives of price stability and balance of 
payments stability should be ranked for this period. Nonetheless, there was a significant, 
lasting change in monetary policy in the 1990s, implying an almost exclusive focus on 
the monetary sector of the economy, and on achieving and maintaining greater monetary 
discipline (Calitz et al 1999: 222). 
 
Stals’s tenure at the Reserve Bank was also characterised by greater Reserve Bank 
independence. This was a major breakthrough for interest rate policy. Independence 
meant that monetary policy decisions were free from the political meddling that was 
often evident in the De Kock era.  
 
According to the South African Reserve Bank Act (which came into effect on 1 August 
1989): 
…the Bank shall pursue…monetary stability and balanced economic 
growth. 
 
This statement was interpreted by SARB officials in the Bank’s April 1990 Mission 
Statement as:  
…the protection of the domestic and external value of the rand.  
 
Note that Stals had a narrower focus compared with the multiple goals formulated in the 
De Kock era.  
 
During the period from 8 August 1989 to 6 March 1998, the SARB adopted a theoretical 
position that Moll (1993:3) termed ‘principled monetarism’. Drawing on public 
statements, Moll argued that this approach rested on three fundamental principles. First, 
inflation was viewed as terribly destructive. From the outset, Dr Stals advanced inflation 
as the touchstone by which he would like to be judged, often stressing the devastating 
effects of the ‘high’ inflation from which the economy was suffering at the time (Stals 
1993a: 32-34). In his opinion 
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…it remains the prime objective of monetary policy to achieve low 
and stable rates of inflation to ensure durable economic growth 
(Stals 1993d: 14).  
 
 
This seems to have meant inflation at or near industrial country levels of 3-4 percent. He 
emphasised that a low and stable inflation rate was required for prices to convey 
information efficiently and for appropriate savings and investment decisions. He also 
argued that a low and stable level of inflation reduced the erosion of the accumulated 
savings of the poorer segments of society as well as risk, and encouraged fixed 
investment. 
 
Secondly, Moll (1993: 3) argued that the Stals program was aimed at creating scope for 
individual markets do their work. For instance, during Stals’s era the Reserve Bank 
argued   
 
…the state should withdraw from the economy as much as it can, 
and where intervention is unavoidable, should follow the guidance of 
the market where possible. The state’s macroeconomic role is seen 
as establishing a stable market-oriented framework for individual 
decision makers, and once this is in place, the economy should grow 
of its own accord (SARB 1990: 5).  
 
Counter-cyclical macroeconomic management was viewed with suspicion, the ideal 
being that the authorities should merely ensure macroeconomic stability, with prices 
under control and real interest rates positive, and rely on markets to gravitate towards 
their natural equilibria (along the lines of neoclassical thinking). 
 
Third, the SARB should be independent of politics, aiming only and consistently at 
financial stability and low inflation (SARB 1992: 33). In this regard, Moll (1993: 4) 
stated that:  
 
…politicians, it seems, are fickle, biased and perhaps incompetent; 
independent well- informed technocrats can manage monetary policy 
far better.  
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In the De Kock era, for instance, it was plain to see that political meddling sometimes 
caused interest rates to move in a way that was unrelated to both market forces and 
economic theory. 
 
Moll (1993: 1-5) emphasised that these three principles constituted a simple but powerful 
theory, often presented by the SARB as encapsulating the latest theory and research from 
abroad. He referred to this theoretical framework as ‘principled monetarism’, which led 
directly to the tight monetary policies that were applied vigorously from 1989 onwards. 
 
This ‘principled monetarist’ policy framework was criticised on various points. Although 
inflation was undeniably a problem, it was argued that the precise transmission process 
between interest rates and the money supply (and therefore inflation) was not clear. High 
interest rates were often associated with unnecessary pain and misery for the domestic 
economy while having only a tentative correlation with the money supply (and therefore 
inflation). 
 
Stals (1996b: 26) began questioning the monetary targeting policy framework, along the 
aforementioned lines, by arguing that  
 
…the integration of South Afr ica in the global financial markets, and 
the innovations caused by the introduction of new payments and 
money transmission techniques, make the money supply a less useful 
indicator of potential underlying inflationary pressures in the 
economy. 
 
He recognised that the money supply was becoming an inappropriate basis for monetary 
policy decisions. 
 
On 7 March 1998, Stals concluded that the liberalisation of and increasing integration of 
financial markets (following South Africa’s re- introduction into the global economy with 
the democratic elections in 1994) and the increasing importance of large and volatile 
international capital flows, had resulted in the usefulness of the M3 money supply as a 
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target for monetary policy being diluted to a point where some alternative anchor for 
monetary policy had to be considered. In his last annual address as Governor of the 
SARB, Stals (1998: 44) put it as follows:  
 
…the Reserve Bank accepts, however, that important structural 
changes in the South African financial system in recent years have 
weakened the more stable relationships that previously existed 
between changes in the money supply and in bank credit extension, 
on the one hand, and in normal spending on goods and services and 
in prices, on the other hand. Changes in the monetary aggregates 
have for the time being lost some of their usefulness as the most 
important indicators of future trends in inflation, and therefore also 
as an anchor for monetary policy decisions. 
 
 
In response to this, the SARB started to follow an eclectic approach towards monetary 
policy. This implied that although the SARB’s final objective was the control of inflation, 
and monetary aggregates were still considered to be intermediate targets, the Bank would 
not change its policy stance automatically when the monetary aggregates were not 
adhering to their growth targets. This new eclectic theoretical framework was based upon 
an in-depth analysis of the factors responsible for inflation. These factors included a 
wider range of financial aggregates, including changes in the amount of bank credit 
extended to the private sector, the deficit before borrowing and the overall borrowing 
requirements of government, the level and structure of interest rates and the foreign 
exchange reserves, and changes in the nominal and real effective exchange rate of the 
rand. Monetary policy was, therefore, conducted within a long-term framework where 
inflation and several financial variables were considered instead of merely concentrating 
on M3 as an intermediate target (Strydom 2001: 31-48). 
 
In March 1998 this approach to monetary policy was extended by the introduction of the 
repurchase-based auction system (the repo system). In the past, the Reserve Bank had 
offered overnight loans at Bank rate to banks to enable them to comply with the Bank’s 
cash reserve requirements. Under the new system, Bank rate was replaced by repo rates, 
which were the outcome of a process whereby banks entered into repurchase agreements 
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in respect of various securities which were sold by tender to the Reserve Bank on a daily 
basis for the purposes of acquiring liquidity (Calitz et al 1999: 220). 
 
Gidlow (1999: 320) describes this system as one whereby the amounts offered at tenders 
by the Reserve Bank were usually equal to the projected liquidity needs of the banks. In 
other words, the Bank normally financed the total liquidity shortage by means of the 
repos. However, on occasion the new repo system was operated in such a manner that all 
the liquidity needs were not provided by the Bank. Fixed amounts of assistance were 
announced beforehand and offered at the daily or intraday tenders, leaving the banks 
short of cash, which could only be replenished by borrowing from the Reserve Bank at a 
penalty rate (the marginal lending rate) fixed by the Bank (in effect the equivalent of the 
previous Bank rate). This system therefore allowed for a differential between the lower 
repo rates and the higher penalty rate or marginal lending rate and a narrowing of this 
differential in rates could be an important indicator of a pending rise in the repo rate, and 
vice versa in the case of a widening differential.  
 
Under this system, the repo rates could change on a daily basis in line with the results of 
the daily repo tenders, with the repo rate exerting a major influence on the money market 
interest rates of the banking institutions, and therefore also overdraft rates. In effect, the 
repo system facility entailed daily tenders being submitted by the banks to the Reserve 
Bank, where fluctuations in the repo rates were expected to lead to a more flexible 
structure of interest than that prevailing under the previous Bank rate system. 
 
Mohr (2001: 126) creates an overall impression of Dr Chris Stals as a man being firmly 
in charge of monetary policy during his decade at the helm. If anything, Mohr argues, he 
was possibly too firmly in charge and sometimes took important decisions on his own, 
based on his own analysis and diagnosis, without consulting some of the senior bank 
officials. He viewed the task of the SARB as ‘the protection of both the internal and 
external value of the rand’, and was therefore sometimes quite willing to raise domestic 
interest rates and use massive amounts of foreign exchange reserve to shore up the 
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international value of the rand during the periodic foreign exchange crises experienced 
during his term of office. 
5.3.2      Economic context 
 
In early 1989, South Africa entered the longest recession of the postwar period (of about 
four years), and the deepest since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The cost of a record 
drop in inflation was a formidable fall in GDP per capita, of over 12 percent, between the 
first quarters of 1989 and 1993. Real GDP growth as well as the movement of other key 
variables are summarised in Table 5.2. 
 
A number of major political and exogenous shocks also affected the course of monetary 
policy during this period. These began with President De Klerk’s initiation of the process 
of political reform on 2 February 1990, by announcing the immediate unbanning of the 
African National Congress (ANC) and other political organisations, as well as the 
imminent release of Nelson Mandela. These decisions heralded the return of South Africa 
to the international political, financial and economic arena but the journey was not 
smooth.  
 
The early 1990s were tumultuous years, both politically and economically.  For instance, 
on the international front monetary policy had to respond to the repercussions of the Gulf 
crisis and the concomitant oil price increases for the measured inflation rates. A 
tightening of monetary policy resulted in intensified downward pressure on domestic 
demand and activity over a fairly extensive period, and was considered inappropriate for 
countering the once-and-for-all effect on the general price level of such an isolated 
exogenous event. Such a policy response, some argue, would have been justified only if 
the exogenous shock on the price level was exerting a lasting effect on inflation 
expectations, and was causing a more permanent acceleration of the wage-price spiral. 
However, Mohr (2001: 126) argued that the direction of monetary policy was often still 
prescribed by balance of payments considerations rather than by domestic economic 
objectives. 
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Table 5.2      MOVEMENTS IN KEY VARIABLES DURING THE STALS ERA 
 
 
 
Year 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
 
 (%) 
Average 
annual 
increase 
in CPI 
(%) 
Growth 
in M3  
 
 
(%) 
Guideline 
range for 
M3  
 
(%) 
Current 
account 
balance  
 
   (R m) 
Financial 
account 
balance  
 
  (R m) 
Prime 
overdraft 
rate at 
year end 
(%) 
1990 - 0,3 14,4 15,33 11-15     5324  - 2410 21,00 
1991 - 1,0 15,3 14,35 8 – 12     6241  - 2543 20,25 
1992 - 2,1 13,9   8,23 7 – 10     5552  - 1491 17,25 
1993   1,2   9,7   7,01   6 – 9     4867  - 5669 15,25 
1994   3,2   9,0 15,72   6 – 9       336    4359 16,25 
1995   3,1   8,7 15,18 6 – 10   - 7989  19871 18,50 
1996   4,3   7,4 13,61 6 – 10   - 8128  13394 20,25 
1997   2,6   8,6 17,15 6 – 10 - 10426  27049 19,25 
1998   0,8   7,1 14,55 6 – 10 - 11630  17300 23,00 
1999   2,0   6,9 10,15 6 – 10   - 3398  32515 15,50 
 
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletins (December 1998, December 2000, June 2003)  
 
 
 
The political changes initiated in 1990 culminated in the first fully democratic elections 
in 1994, and in the lifting of sanctions and the normalisation of South Africa’s 
international economic relations. The end of apartheid improved investment conditions in 
South Africa, alleviated the balance of payments constraint and raised the country’s 
growth potential. 
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These developments ultimately paved the way for the abolition of the financial rand on 
13 March 1995 and the gradual phasing out of foreign exchange control on residents. But 
it also generated new uncertainties. The international community was unsure about what 
policy directions the new government would pursue and there was also uncertainty about 
the sustainability of the net inflow of foreign capital. The adoption of the growth, 
employment and redistribution (GEAR) strategy in June 1996 went a long way towards 
reducing uncertainty about economic policy. However, South Africa’s reintegration into 
the global world economy meant that the economy was now considerably more 
vulnerable to exogenous events. For instance, in May 1998, the impact of the financial 
turbulence in Asia, which had been felt since the second half of 1997, caused severe 
pressure on South African financial markets. The collapse in East Asian economies, such 
as those of the Republic of Korea and Malaysia, resulted in increasing nervousness 
among international investors about the return on and risk associated with their 
investments in so-called ‘emerging markets’. Negative market sentiment spread all over 
the world and the indiscriminating nature of market nervousness was particularly striking. 
The impact on South Africa was sudden and severe, and entailed major speculation 
against the rand. The nominal effective exchange rate of the rand depreciated by 13,5 
percent from 22 May to the end of June 1998. The capital account of the balance of 
payments was severely affected, with massive capital outflows occurring in a short space 
of time (Calitz et al 1999: 262). The full impact of these events on interest rate policy will 
be discussed in the analysis that follows. 
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5.3.3      Movements in prime interest rates during the Stals era 
 
August 1989 – October 1991: A period of fluctuating interest rates 
 
Prime increased by 100 basis points on 11 October 1989 to 21 percent. It was then 
reduced by 100 basis points on 2 April 1990 to 20 percent. It was subsequently raised 25 
basis points, reaching 20,25 percent in October 1991. 
 
Stals (1990: 42) justified the first increase on the basis of increases announced in the 
discount rates of a number of central banks in Western Europe and in the United 
Kingdom. Higher foreign interest rates cause a shift in trade financing from foreign to 
domestic sources, putting the capital account of the balance of payments under pressure. 
This, Stals (1990: 43) argued, was particularly problematic for South Africa because  
 
…the pressure on capital account of the balance of payments puts 
pressure on the exchange rate and eventually on inflation. In view of 
the relatively low levels of South Africa’s foreign reserves and 
existing commitments to repay foreign loans, and also taking 
account of the relatively low price of gold at this stage, the country 
can ill afford any further pressure on the balance of payments. 
 
 
The current account of the balance of payments was also coming under pressure on 
account of the low gold price and the higher level of imports. The SARB had to consider 
the responses of monetary policy to the repercussions of the Gulf crisis and the 
concomitant oil price increases for the measured inflation rates. 
 
There were also a number of domestic economic developments that, according to Stals 
(1990), made it important for South Africa to maintain nominal interest rates at an 
appropriately high level. The growth in the money supply (M3), for example, remained 
above its targeted range. The range was set at 14 – 18 percent in 1989 (see Table 5.1), 
while the actual outcome was around 24 percent. In 1990, the target range was reduced to 
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11 to 15 percent but was once again overshot, albeit by a small margin (see Table 5.2). 
Against this background, Stals believed that it was necessary to maintain positive real 
rates of interest in the fight against inflation and for the protection of the balance of 
payments.  
 
In determining short-term interest rates the Bank therefore took account of movements in 
foreign interest rates and its implications for the capital account of the balance of 
payments, the level of foreign reserves and exchange rate changes. From a theoretical 
perspective, Stals’s monetary policy framework of ‘principled’ monetarism was thus not 
dissimilar to De Kock’s ‘pragmatic’ monetarism of the 1980s, although Stals did seem to 
attach a greater emphasis to lowering inflation. 
 
April 1992 - November 1993: A period of declining interest rates 
 
During this period the prime overdraft rate was reduced on five occasions. It was 
lowered from a high of 20,25 percent on 1 April 1992 to a low of 15,25 percent on 1 
November 1993. 
 
The prime overdraft rate was reduced in a series of orderly reductions, mainly as a result 
of a decline in the inflation rate and the low rate of growth in the M3 monetary aggregate. 
In 1992, the rate of increase in M3 fell well within the range of 7 to 10 percent. In 1993, 
after lowering the target range to 6 to 9 percent, the actual rate of M3 growth came in at 
around 7 percent (see Table 5.2). Moreover, the economy was in a downward phase of 
the business cycle. This corresponded with worldwide recessionary tendencies. In an 
attempt to revive economic growth, many central banks in European countries dropped 
interest rates and the SARB could therefore also reduce rates without putting undue 
pressure on the capital account of the balance of payments. There was also some easing 
of the pressure on the SARB’s net gold and other foreign reserves as a result of an overall 
surplus on the balance of payments. 
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In a speech given by Stals (1993a: 31-35), he re-emphasised his view that the SARB 
followed a monetary policy aimed at protecting the value of the rand. In pursuit of this 
mandate, the SARB followed a certain sequence in its decisions on monetary policy. First 
it set and announced guidelines for an acceptable growth rate in the money supply at the 
beginning of each year. Second, the SARB recognised the fact that money was mostly 
created through the extension of bank credit in South Africa (ie the money supply was 
endogenous), therefore the SARB kept a close watch on the increase in outstanding bank 
credit. Excessive increases in bank credit were seen to lead to excessive increases in the 
money supply and therefore inflation. Third, the SARB had to guard against increases in 
overall liquidity using open-market operations. Fourth, to the extent that the rate of 
increase in the money supply was driven by the demand for funds, it was imperative that 
realistic interest rates be maintained at all times. 
 
This led Stals (1993a: 33) to conclude that the SARB could and did influence interest 
rates in two ways: through changes in Bank rate and open-market operations. This 
argument causes one to question Stals’s rigid adherence to the belief that short-term 
interest rates were determined by market forces. His claim that ‘realistic interest rates 
must be maintained at all times’ (Stals 1993a: 32) implied short-term rates were 
deliberately manipulated through changes in Bank rate in pursuance of a stable currency. 
 
September 1994 – July 1996: A period of rising interest rates 
 
During this period, the prime overdraft rate was increased on six occasions. It was raised 
from its low of 15,25 percent on 26 September 1994, to a high of 20,5 percent on 20 May 
1996. 
 
From 1994 to 1996, bank credit expanded strongly. M3 growth exceeded the guideline 
range, owing to buoyant economic conditions (reflected in the high level of economic 
activity in the financial markets and the relatively high rates of GDP growth) and the 
switching of foreign trade financing from foreign to domestic sources of credit (see Table 
5.2). In response to these developments, Stals (1995: 27) argued that  
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… financial stability will not be sustainable and inflation could 
easily accelerate if these growth rates in the money supply and bank 
credit extension are not checked.  
 
Broadly speaking, Stals justified the interest rate changes during this period as steps to 
bring the Bank’s rates more in line with market-related interest rates to  
 
…carry a clear signal of the resolve of the monetary authorities to 
bring rates of growth in the monetary aggregates back to a level 
more in line with the objective of the authorities to reduce inflation 
gradually to a more acceptable level (Stals 1995: 28).  
 
A major development during the first 5 months of 1996 was the turmoil in the foreign 
exchange markets and the impact this had on the rest of the economy. The external value 
of the rand fell sharply. The disturbances in the foreign exchange market had serious 
consequences for South Africa’s transactions with the rest of the world. The large net 
inflows of capital, which had been recorded from the second half of 1994, changed to a 
large outflow of capital. The SARB responded to these developments by increasing Bank 
rate. 
 
Calitz et al (1999: 239-240) argue that these interest rate increases occurred at a relatively 
early stage of the economic upswing of 1994–1996 in response to signals in the 
international financial markets and the possible impact of interest rate differentials on 
capital flows and trade financing for the financial account of the balance of payments.  
 
Critics such as Nel (1994) argued that the monetary authorities should have allowed the 
rand to depreciate, rather than push up interest rates. The stimulative effect of the 
depreciation of the currency, he argued, would have resulted in higher economic growth 
and a more protracted upswing. The monetary authorities’ concern with the adverse 
inflationary consequences of a major fall in the external value of the rand as a result of 
the financial crisis in early 1996 (given international markets’ risk aversion to a country 
with high inflation and low foreign exchange reserves) meant that both the balance of 
payments and price stability received a higher monetary policy priority than short-term 
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economic growth during this period. Interest rates continued to be used for balance of 
payments purposes – to underpin the inflow of foreign capital and to build up foreign 
reserves. This is supported by the statement that it  
 
…has become a first priority to restore some stability to the foreign 
exchange market, and to find a new stable base for the exchange rate 
of the rand from which the future course of monetary policy can be 
guided (Stals 1996c: 29). 
 
Despite these interest rate increases, the relatively high growth in M3 continued and 
significantly exceeded the guideline range. Interest rate policy thus appeared to be losing 
its effectiveness as an instrument for controlling the money supply. Stals realised, on the 
one hand, that the excessive expansion of bank credit was putting undue pressure on the 
money supply and dictated the need for maintaining high interest rates. On the other 
hand, due to the abolition of apartheid and the increasingly open nature of the South 
African economy, higher relative interest rates were attracting more short-term and 
volatile capital from the rest of the world, which was adding to domestic liquidity and to 
the ability of the banks to extend more credit, thereby adding to the money supply. As a 
result, Stals (1996a: 29) admitted that  
 
…it is becoming increasingly more difficult for the Reserve Bank to 
control the money supply.  
  
July 1996 – October 1997: A period of fluctuating interest rates 
 
The prime overdraft interest rate was reduced by 25 basis points on 1 October 1996. It 
was then increased by 100 basis points on 21 November 1996, followed by a 100 basis 
point decline on 21 October 1997. On this date, the prime overdraft interest rate was 
19,25 percent. 
 
The initial 25 basis point adjustment on 1 October 1996 was a technical adjustment and 
did not reflect a change in the monetary policy stance of the SARB. Towards late October 
1996, the rand depreciated a further 5 percent and Stals (1996d: 29) argued that the 
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steady depreciation of the rand that began in February 1996, had reached a point where 
the value of the currency no longer reflected basic economic developments (such as 
changes in the purchasing power of the currency, the international competitiveness of the 
South African economy or cyclical trends in the current account of the balance of 
payments). Stals (1996d) believed that the depreciation of the rand held serious threats 
for an escalation of inflation in the next year, which justified the need for a more cautious  
monetary policy stance aimed at ‘protecting the internal value of the rand’. In response, 
the SARB decided to raise Bank rate from 16 percent to 17 percent on 21 November 
1996, resulting in an increase in the prime rate to 20,25 percent. This interest rate 
increase was also attributable to the excessive growth in M3 for 1996 and 1997 (see 
Table 5.2). 
 
By September 1997, growth in real GDP slowed down to 1,7 percent from 3,2 percent in 
the previous year (see Table 5.2).The tightening of monetary policy in 1996 appeared to 
have averted a potentially harmful spiral of wage and price increases from the repetitive 
depreciations of the rand. Stals (1997a: 33) believed that after the 21,9% depreciation of 
the currency in 1996, the exchange rate had stabilised. 
 
Most of the financial aggregates used by the Reserve Bank as a basis for monetary policy 
decisions (such as the growth in real GDP and foreign exchange reserves) moved in the 
right direction to justify an interest rate reduction. Even though in some instances, for 
example, in the case of money supply, the rate of increase in the M3 still exceeded what 
was regarded as sustainable for financial stability (see Table 5.2). The Reserve Bank was, 
however, satisfied that a reduction of 1 percent was justified. As from Monday, 20 
October 1997, Bank rate was reduced from 17 percent to 16 percent. The next day, the 
prime overdraft rate was reduced from 20,25 to 19,25 percent. 
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October 1997 -  August 1998: A period of rising interest rates 
 
The prime overdraft rate was increased on 5 occasions during this period. It increased 
from a low of 18,25 percent on 9 March 1998 to a high of 25,50 percent on 31 August 
1998. 
 
As a result of the growing complexity of functional relationships between the various 
financial variables, the Bank decided it would be unwise to over-emphasise money 
supply and bank credit extension as indicators for its monetary policy decisions. On 7 
March 1998, the Bank decided to adjust its monetary policy framework. It abandoned 
monetary targeting and opted for a more eclectic approach to monetary policy. The 
Bank’s monetary policy stance was influenced by guidelines for the M3 money supply as 
well as by a range of other financial indicators, including changes in the amount of bank 
credit extended to the private sector, the deficit before borrowing, the overall borrowing 
requirement of government, the level and structure of interest rates, the foreign exchange 
reserves and changes in the nominal and real effective exchange rate of the rand 
(Strydom 2001: 33).  
 
In March 1998 this approach to monetary policy was extended by the introduction of the 
repurchase-based auction system (the repo system). In the past, the Reserve Bank had 
offered overnight loans at Bank rate to banks to enable them to comply with the Bank’s 
cash reserve requirements. Under the new system, Bank rate was replaced by repo rates 
which are the outcome of a process whereby banks enter into repurchase agreements in 
respect of various securities which are sold by tender to the Reserve Bank on a daily basis 
for the purposes of acquiring liquidity (Gidlow 1999: 320). 
 
Soon after this change in monetary policy framework, financial problems experienced in 
emerging-market economies in South East Asia triggered an unexpected contraction of 
the net inflow of portfolio investment. This put the new repo system to a severe test. In 
order to protect the capital account of the balance of payments (and the currency), 
monetary conditions were tightened by successive increases in the repo rate. The rate was 
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increased from 17 percent on 18 June 1998 to 20,4 percent the next day and to 24 percent 
on 22 June 1998. The prime overdraft rate increased from 18,25 percent in March 1998 to 
25,50 percent in August. These changes were made with the intention of raising the cost 
of speculating against the rand with domestic funds, thereby protecting the capital 
account of the balance of payments:  
 
…this once again demonstrates the continued impact of balance of 
payments considerations on interest rate policy in no uncertain terms 
(Calitz et al 1999: 255).  
 
These interest rate increases succeeded in halting the fall of the external value of the rand, 
but at the cost of substantially higher interest rates. 
 
Oddly, this episode was preceded by a period during which the underlying financial 
situation was inherently sound and even strengthening. The deficit of the national 
government was shrinking, inflation was declining and international reserves were 
increasing. As a result, there were widely-held expectations of a decline in the official 
lending rates of the Reserve Bank.  
 
The above episode illustrates that exogenous events were often important determinants of 
interest rate movements. It also emphasises the importance of balance of payments 
considerations for interest rate policy. This view is supported by the fact that Stals did not 
consider the declared mission of the SARB of aiming at the simultaneous protection of 
the domestic and external value of the rand as being contradictory. Stals (1991:58) 
believed these two objectives were supplementary:  
 
…and the one can hardly be achieved without the other. In fighting 
inflation, the SARB will at the same time, and with the same 
instruments of monetary policy, defend the external value of the 
rand.  
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In view of the close interrelationships between the internal and external value of the rand, 
the question may be asked whether the priority of monetary policy was the reduction of 
the rate of inflation or to ensure the stability of the external value of the rand. Stals (1991: 
61) was of the opinion that in South Africa it would be a very difficult task to reduce the 
rate of inflation without first ensuring exchange rate stability. The reason for this was that 
a substantial percentage of South Africa’s gross domestic product was directly affected 
by variations in the external value of the rand:  
 
It is almost a precondition that the exchange rate of the rand be 
stabilised before any success in reducing inflation is achieved in 
South Africa (Stals 1991: 62). 
 
October 1998- October 1999: A period of declining interest rates  
 
In a series of 11 consecutive reductions in just more than 12 months, the prime rate 
decreased from its high of 25,50 percent on 19 October 1998 to a low of 15,50 percent on 
4 October 1999. 
 
From October 1998, stability returned to global financial markets. With the return of 
stability, capital flows to emerging markets resumed, exchange rates stabilised and as the 
domestic economic conditions remained subdued, the demand for credit remained low 
and growth in M3 slowed down quite perceptibly (see Table 5.2). With little inflationary 
pressure and a sound balance of payments, Stals decided to ease interest rates.  
 
Although monetary targeting still featured as an anchor for monetary policy, M3 was no 
longer used in isolation as a criterion for interest rate decisions. Stals’s decision to reduce 
interest rates during this period also took into consideration the level of South Africa’s 
reserves, the overall balance of payments position and the implications of the current 
monetary policy stance for future levels of inflation. 
 
Stals (1999a: 92) indicated that until inflation targeting was formally adopted, the Bank 
would continue to remain flexible in its policy implementation strategies:  
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The intention is not to implement policy according to any strict 
policy rule. The Bank will, rather, exercise discretionary judgment in 
deciding what combination of money supply growth, changes in 
bank credit extension, amount of liquidity in the banking sector and 
levels of interest rates should be aimed at in any given set of 
circumstances in order to achieve the objective of low inflation (my 
own emphasis). 
 
5.3.4      Concluding remarks on the Stals era 
 
At a gala dinner in his honour at his retirement, Stals (1999b) listed what he regarded as 
the ‘Twelve commandments of Central Banking’. His first commandment was that a ‘true 
central banker will always be against inflation’. Stals’s commitment to achieving a low 
level of inflation at all costs was also reinforced by his earlier statement that  
 
…the objective of monetary policy, namely to protect the value of 
the currency, should…not be disrupted by the changing phases of the 
business cycle (Stals 1993a: 34) 
 
Was Stals’s obsession with a low level of inflation at the expense of growth a wise 
position or not? Nattrass (1998: 189) argued that South Africa’s economy had been 
severely affected by the willingness of foreign investors to supply the domestic economy 
with financial capital (particularly during the De Kock era, when the authorities operated 
under a balance of payments constraint). In the De Kock era we saw that a persistent 
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments was unsustainable as long as 
foreigners were reluctant to supply financial capital. During a significant part of his 
tenure, Stals was relatively free from the burdens of the balance of payments cons traint 
and he consequently pursued a vigorous anti- inflationary policy by contracting economic 
activity. The willingness of foreign investors to supply financial capital has been 
absolutely crucial to the South African economy. For this reason, Stals’s tough position 
against inflation might have been justified if the position served to encourage inflows of 
foreign financial capital. This could well have been the case, because foreign investors 
were unwilling to risk their financial capital in the context of a depreciating currency. An 
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anti- inflationary policy in South Africa could thus actually have induced foreigners to 
invest, precisely because it eliminated the risk of persistent currency depreciations. 
However, investors may have been equally discouraged by the slower growth caused by 
Stals’s restrictive policies (ibid). 
 
Stals was heavily criticised for these restrictive polices. Moll (1993:13) for instance 
argued that Stals was operating under a monetarist ‘straightjacket’ by justifying his 
interest rate decisions in pursuance of sound money. He argued that Stals’s view of 
lowering inflation by cripplingly high interest rates at a considerable cost to growth and 
welfare - all in pursuit of ‘ideologically- laden goals’ - may have been misplaced:  
 
A gentler adjustment program, taking account of the social costs 
involved need to preserve investments and encourage industrial 
exports, would have permitted a slower but steadier transition 
towards lower inflation, with fewer resources destroyed in the 
process, creating greater political credibility and better growth 
prospects (Moll 1993:14). 
 
What theoretical framework did Stals align himself to? Moll (1993) described Stals’s 
theoretical view as being ‘principled monetarist’. This theoretical view was based upon 
the monetarist proposition that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, in line with the 
quantity theory of money (a view shared by De Kock). Stals was a firm believer of 
maintaining positive real interest rates with the objective of controlling the money 
supply. In consequence, South Africa experienced a prolonged period of high interest 
rates. Tight money, Stals argued, was supposed to rein in the money supply and reduce 
inflation. 
 
However, from the analysis of the Stals era, it appears that the theoretical framework was 
more Post Keynesian than monetarist in nature. This conclusion is based upon two 
arguments. First, the monetary authorities were unable control the money supply - 
particularly in an open economy with foreign capital flows and its impact on liquidity 
within the domestic markets (this is consistent with the Post Keynesian assumption of an 
endogenous money supply). 
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Second, Stals was fond of telling his audiences that he did not set interest rates - he 
merely followed the lead of the financial markets. In his view, the market determines 
interest rates. While it was clear that the SARB did set interest rates, in the sense that 
movements in the repo rate affected the structure of interest rates, Nattrass (1998: 65-80) 
argued that there was also something to the Governor’s argument.  
 
When the SARB decided on what rate to offer the private banks at the discount window, 
the Governor took various indicators in the financial markets into account. One important 
indicator was the market yield on Treasury Bills (TB’s). According to Stals, a Treasury 
Bill rate higher than Bank rate could only be tolerated if the gap between the two was less 
than a quarter of a percentage point. If the yield on the Treasury Bill rose higher than this, 
then it would pay the commercial banks to borrow from the SARB and buy Treasury 
Bills (the reason why a quarter percentage point difference could be tolerated was that 
such a margin would effectively be eliminated by transaction costs). This implied that if 
the financial markets drove up the yield on Treasury Bills, the SARB would be forced to 
follow the market’s lead and raise Bank rate. Nattrass argued, however, that the SARB 
had not been shy to influence market interest rates. In May 1996, for instance, the SARB 
actively entered the market for Treasury Bills in an effort to curb the rise in the yield, and 
hence avoid having to raise Bank rate. Bank rate was 16 percent at the time, and Stals did 
not want the Treasury Bill yield going higher than 16,25 percent. So the SARB entered 
the market to buy up Treasury Bills (which put upward pressure on the price and 
downward pressure on the yield) (Nattrass 1998: 74). 
 
During the early 1990s, however, interest rates were deliberately kept at high levels in 
pursuance of lower inflation. If interest rates were determined by the market, they would 
have fluctuated with liquidity conditions in the financial markets and it would not have 
been possible to maintain high interest rates. The Bank was able to deliberately control 
liquidity conditions (through open-market operations for instance). The Bank’s actions 
were thus consistent with the Post Keynesian assumption of an exogenous interest rate. 
This statement was supported by Stals (1998: 43):  
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In managing the amount of liquidity that the Reserve Bank is 
prepared to provide to banking institutions, the monetary authorities 
maintain an important influence on the level of interest 
rates…Interest rates therefore serve as the main operational 
instrument of monetary policy (my own emphasis).  
 
If the Bank used the interest rate as the main operational instrument of monetary policy, it 
is not endogenous (this is consistent with the Post Keynesian assumption of an exogenous 
interest rate). 
 
The only hint of monetarism in Stals’s theoretical framework appears to be the 
recognition of a relationship between the money supply and prices. This relationship was 
tentative at best (as was argued in the analysis of the De Kock era). It was predicated on 
the quantity theory of money, the main assumption being that the money supply is 
exogenously determined (which was officially refuted by the SARB in 1997).  
 
5.4      THE MBOWENI ERA (1999-2002) 
5.4.1      Background 
 
Shortly after assuming office as Governor of the SARB on 8 August 1999, Mboweni 
announced, in the governor’s annual address to shareholders of the Bank (on 24 August 
1999), that a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) was to be formed, consisting of the 
governor and deputy governors of the bank as voting members and senior officials of the 
Bank as non-voting members. The creation of the MPC was a major departure for the 
SARB. The previous governors of the SARB had traditionally taken important policy 
decisions on their own, after consulting with only their most trusted advisers, and took 
sole responsibility for such decisions (Mohr 2001: 130). The 14-member MPC would 
now make joint decisions with regard to monetary policy decisions.  
 
The MPC held its first meeting on 13 October 1999, and in his opening statement, 
Mboweni said that the MPC would  
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…consider and evaluate the state of the economy, the current stance 
of monetary policy and the operational procedures in the conduct of 
monetary policy, and formulate the changes deemed necessary on 
monetary and operations procedures (Mboweni 1999a: 59). 
 
As far as the monetary policy framework is concerned, Mboweni continued operating 
within the ‘eclectic’ framework (introduced after the abandonment of monetary targeting 
in 1998) until a formal inflation targeting framework was introduced on 23 February 
2000. In line with this ‘eclectic’ theoretical framework, specific note was taken by the 
MPC of the following factors when determining short-term interest rates (Mboweni 
1999b: 61-64):  
 
First, it looked at international economic developments – for 
instance, South Africa’s real interest rates would be compared to 
those in other countries and the impact on the balance of payments 
would be considered. 
 
Second, the MPC evaluated real economic conditions in South 
Africa. Here consideration was taken of factors such as: 
 
· the growth in real GDP 
· the growth in real domestic expenditure 
· the rise in the cost of labour and wages 
· nominal consumer price inflation (based on the CPI) 
· nominal production price inflation (based on the PPI) 
 
Third, domestic monetary developments were taken into 
consideration. This was evaluated based upon: 
 
· growth in the M3 money supply 
· growth in total domestic credit extension 
 
Fourth, domestic money and capital markets were evaluated. In 
particular, the focus was on liquidity in the money market and its 
effect on consumer price inflation. 
 
Fifth, the balance of payments position and the foreign exchange 
market were considered, particularly the current account and the 
country’s ability to finance a current account deficit.  
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Sixth, the total gold and other foreign reserves and the impact of 
interest rate changes on the nominal effective exchange rate of the 
rand were examined. 
 
Seventh, stability in the financial sector was evaluated, including 
analyses of the resilience of the banking sector in terms of how well 
domestic banks were capitalised and the extent to which other sound 
banking supervision principles were being applied. 
 
Finally, monetary policy developments, including an analysis of 
domestic economic conditions, were taken into consideration when 
deciding on changes in the repo rate. 
 
On 23 February 2000, the Minister of Finance announced in his budget speech that the 
government had decided to adopt a formal inflation targeting framework and to set an 
inflation target range of 3-6 percent for the year 2002. One of the underlying reasons for 
the change in the monetary policy strategy was the view that a stable money demand 
relationship had become increasing difficult to identify. The ambiguous nature of M3 
money demand studies in South Africa (see Moll 2000) confirmed that the link between 
money, income and prices had become less stable in recent years, suggesting that M3 had 
lost its usefulness as a reliable indicator of monetary policy. The endogeneity of the 
money stock appears to be one of the main theoretical propositions underlying the basic 
model of an inflation targeting strategy. One of the main advantages of such a strategy is 
that it incorporates all the available information and not only one monetary aggregate. In 
fact, many inflation targeting models do not even include a money demand function, and 
those that do, tend to treat money as endogenous to a wide range of structural and cost-
push forces of inflation (Svensson 1999). 
 
The transmission mechanism of inflation-targeting models includes an aggregate demand 
channel, which interacts with inflation expectations, domestic inflation and the exchange 
rate (see Chapter 4). Monetary policy affects inflation directly through aggregate demand 
channel via short-term interest rates. In inflation targeting models causation runs from 
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prices to the money supply, and not vice versa, as the monetarists believe (Nell 2003). 
This is consistent with the Post Keynesian view outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
Monetary aggregates are, however, still monitored closely, together with other economic 
indicators (such as the level of international interest rates, the shape and position of the 
yield curve, changes in nominal and real salaries and wages, changes in employment, 
general money market conditions, changes in asset prices, the overall balance of 
payments position, the terms of trade, exchange rate developments and the public sector 
borrowing requirement) in deciding on the course of interest rate movements (Mboweni 
2000a: 59). 
 
Inflation targeting was adopted in South Africa, as it had developed a good track record 
as a reliable anchor for monetary policy in a number of countries, including New 
Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel13. Inflation targeting has a number of 
distinct advantages. First, it makes the objective of monetary policy clear - thereby 
improving planning in the private and public sectors. Second, it forms part of a 
formalised, co-ordinated effort to contain inflation in pursuit of the broader economic 
objectives of high economic growth and employment creation. Third, it helps to focus 
monetary policy, thereby enhancing the accountability of the central bank to the public. 
Finally, it provides an anchor for expectations of future inflation that should influence 
price and wage setting.  
 
Mboweni defines the primary objective of monetary policy within this new monetary 
policy framework as being to:  
 
Protect the value of the currency in order to obtain balanced and 
sustainable economic growth in the country (Mboweni 2000a: 57). 
 
This implies price stability in the sense that changes in the general price level do not 
materially affect the economic decision-making processes:  
 
                                                 
13 For an overview of the international experience with inflation targeting, see SARB 2001a: 5. 
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Although relative price movements will still have an impact on 
production, consumption, savings and investment, the rate of 
inflation or deflation would be so low that it would no longer be an 
important factor in economic decision-making (ibid). 
 
Although the achievement of the inflation target becomes the overriding objective of 
monetary policy in an inflation-targeting framework, Mboweni (2000a: 59) was quick to 
point out that the adoption of the new framework did not mean the central bank must 
apply rigid rules and was left without any discretion:  
 
Exclusive emphasis on inflation goals without a careful analysis of 
economic conditions can lead to serious distortions in the economy 
that could result in higher inflation over the long term. A rigorously 
applied rule deprives the central bank of its ability to deal with 
unusual or unforeseen circumstances. In the application of inflation 
targeting, allowance will be made for serious supply shocks. Some 
discretion must be applied in order to avoid costly losses in terms of 
output and jobs (ibid).  
 
Mboweni (2002a) expresses this point quite succinctly by arguing that the analysis and 
decision making with respect to monetary policy is more a ‘science of feeling’ - where 
the possible impact of monetary policy decisions are based upon a variety of variables 
including politics, inflation rates, balance of payments, money market variables, capital 
market variables and the share market. 
 
The philosophy of interest-rate policy changed dramatically with the introduction of 
inflation targeting. For instance, Mboweni (2002b) explicitly acknowledges that the 
Reserve Bank is responsible for determining short-term interest rates. As mentioned 
earlier, the SARB no longer uses intermediate targets such as the money supply or other 
variables as a means towards achieving its overall objective of price stability (in an 
inflation-targeting framework the causal relationship between money and prices no 
longer applies). Instead the Reserve Bank uses interest rates directly as a policy variable 
in achieving its inflation target. In other words, the SARB determines short-term interest 
rates based upon its policy objective of targeting inflation, and then creates the necessary 
market conditions (through open-market operations for instance) in order to support such 
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an interest rate. This is an explicit confirmation of the Post Keynesian framework of 
economic analysis and is in sharp contrast to the ‘monetarist’ frameworks in which both 
De Kock and Stals operated. 
 
Within an inflation targeting framework, Mboweni (2002a) listed the following variables 
as among those that were considered when a decision on the appropriate level of interest 
rates was taken: 
 
§ food price inflation 
§ trends in the CPI, PPI, core CPI and CPIX 
§ reports on inflation expectations  
§ the balance of payments position,  particularly the current account 
§ non-resident behaviour in the bond and share market 
§ unit labour costs 
§ labour productivity 
§ oil price developments 
§ unemployment and growth prospects 
§ commodity prices 
§ yield curves 
§ monetary aggregates (particularly M3) 
§ credit extension 
§ government expenditure behaviour 
§ money market interest rates 
§ the gap between the repo rate and other market interest rates 
 
5.4.2      Economic context 
 
In an inflation targeting framework, the inflation environment is affected by several 
factors. These factors include the key variables summarised in Table 5.3 below. In order 
to apply monetary policy effectively, these factors, which include the external 
environment and exchange rate developments, have to be assessed. 
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Table 5.3 MOVEMENTS IN KEY VARIABLES DURING THE MBOWENI ERA 
 
 
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin, June 2003 
 
 
In 2000, a number of developments occurred on the international front. A major factor 
was the oil price increases owing to production cuts by OPEC. The rising oil prices had a 
direct impact on domestic prices and were a key consideration in monetary policy 
decisions. Another key factor was the general state of the international economy and 
world interest rates. During the second half of 1999 and the first half of 2000, the United 
States economy continued its unprecedented economic expansion. This resulted in the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) raising interest rates no less then six times between June 1999 and 
May 2000. This upward trend in world interest rates was also observed in the euro area 
where the European Central Bank (ECB) raised interest rates on seven occasions between 
November 1999 and October 2000. 
 
The path of the rand exchange rate also figured prominently in monetary policy 
decisions, given its direct and indirect impact on domestic prices. The exchange rate 
 
 
   Year 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
increase 
in CPI 
(%) 
Growth 
in M3  
 
 
(%) 
Current 
account 
balance  
 
(R m) 
Financial 
account 
balance  
 
(R m) 
Prime 
overdraft 
rate at 
year end 
(%) 
1999  2,0  6,9 10,15 - 3926  32 515 15,5 
2000  3,5  7,8   7,50 - 3653    2 220 14,5 
2001  2,8  6,6 16,72 - 1687  - 4 413 13,0 
2002  3,0  9,3 12,78   3280  18 728 17,0 
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came under consistent pressure during 2000, partly as a result of capital flowing out of 
emerging markets into the buoyant stock markets in the United States. Political upheaval 
in Zimbabwe during April/May 2000 put further pressure on the rand. However, during 
2000, the rand’s weakness was mainly against the strong US dollar and had less effect on 
consumer prices than had been expected (SARB 2001b: 10).  
 
The second half of 2000 saw a dramatic  change in the growth rate in the United States, 
although the full extent was only evident at the end of the year. In September 2000, the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble and corporate scandals heralded the end of the economic 
boom. The well-known adage, that when the United States sneezes the rest of the world 
catches a cold, applied once again. Growth in most countries slowed down in tandem 
with the slower growth in the United States, and the general pressure on world interest 
rates abated during the last few months of 2000. 
 
During 2000, international developments were generally a negative factor for the 
inflation outlook and therefore for short-term interest rates. Rising oil prices, rising 
international interest rates and high interest rates in the United States made it difficult to 
reduce South African interest rates. 
 
In 2001, the United States economy went into recession. Terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington on September 11, 2001 caused panic in financial markets and 
compounded the economic problems that had already begun with the stock market 
collapse in 2000. These events had a number of detrimental effects on the South African 
economy. First, sluggish growth after the dotcom bust caused a slowdown in South 
African exports. Second, a general climate of risk-aversion meant that emerging markets 
were subject to volatile capital flows. In addition to this, South Africa’s large net open 
forward position in foreign exchange markets resulted in speculative attacks that saw the 
rand depreciate significantly, with severe implications for the inflation outlook.  
 
During 2001, the rand continued to depreciate against the US dollar, moving from around 
R7,60 at the beginning of the year to over R9,30 in the second week of October. The rand 
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depreciated against all the major currencies. Its weakness during this period was a result 
of both internal and external factors. Internal factors included the impact of strikes, 
delays in the restructuring of public enterprises and leads and lags in foreign payments 
and receipts. External factors included the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and the 
negative sentiment towards emerging markets in general following the crises in Turkey 
and Argentina. Towards the end of the year the rand depreciated sharply against the 
major currencies and during 2001 as a whole, it depreciated by a massive 37 percent 
against the dollar. 
 
In 2002, the rand rallied making it one of the world’s top-performing currencies. Part of 
the appreciation was ascribed to exporters’ repatriation of export earnings, declining 
pressures on emerging-market currencies, the weakening of the dollar following the 
corporate governance scandals in the United States, and the gold price rally, accompanied 
by an improved outlook for commodities (SARB 2002: 12). 
 
5.4.3      Movements in prime overdraft interest rates during the Mboweni era 
 
August 1999- January 2000: A period of declining interest rates 
 
The prime overdraft rate was reduced on two occasions, from 16,50 percent on 2 August 
1999 to 14,50 percent on 24 January 2000. 
 
The decision to reduce interest rates during this period rested with the MPC. This was an 
important milestone in the history of the SARB as the decision to change interest rates 
was no longer made by the governor alone. The MPC used an eclectic view to decide on 
interest rate changes. The stance of monetary policy was based upon international 
economic developments, stability in the financial sector, the state of the balance of 
payments and the foreign exchange market and domestic money and capital markets. 
Monetary aggregates, particularly the M3, continued to be used as a basis for interest rate 
decisions. 
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The MPC decided to reduce interest rates during this period owing to South Africa’s 
sound economic fundamentals, as indicated by a decline in inflation (see Table 4.3), the 
reduction in government deficits and the restructuring of South African businesses in the 
late 1990s. The Reserve Bank also deliberately eased liquidity conditions in the money 
market during the last four months of 1999 to allay fears arising from the millennium 
change. The strength of the United States economy also influenced the decision to reduce 
interest rates (SARB 2000a: 1-5). 
 
February 2000 – September 2001: A period of declining interest rates 
 
On 24 January 2000 the prime overdraft rate was lowered from 15,50 percent to 14,50 
percent. It was reduced on two further occasions during this period, reaching a low of 13 
percent on 25 September 2001. 
 
For most of 2000, monetary policy was influenced by domestic and international factors 
moving in opposite directions, with different intensities at different points in time. For 
instance, domestic factors remained conducive to continued declines in inflation owing to 
low levels of capacity utilisation and declining rates of increase in labour costs. In 
addition, overseas interest rates began declining in the face of a deepening global 
slowdown. Political events during this period, however, had negative effect on the 
outlook for inflation. Crises in Zimbabwe, Argentina and Turkey impacted negatively on 
the rand, with potentially inflationary consequences. In the aftermath of the attacks on 
New York and Washington, further pressure was placed on the rand. 
 
It was felt, nevertheless, that the target rate of inflation could still be achieved. Interest 
rates were reduced during this period due, inter alia, to the fact that the inflation rate as 
measured by the overall consumer price index excluding mortgage interest costs (CPIX) 
declined to the top end of the inflation target range in July 2001 (SARB 2001b: 14). 
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Inflation targeting is a forward- looking approach and an inflation-targeting central bank 
has to decide how its current policy stance will affect future price developments. 
Decisions to change interest rates in this framework therefore depend on expected future 
price developments. However, interest rate changes appear to have been made in line 
with current CPIX inflation, rather than the forecasted inflation. In this period, for 
example, interest rates were lowered because the top end of the inflation target had been 
achieved for the current period. In an inflation-targeting framework, interest rate 
decisions are supposed to be based on future price developments. 
 
The Reserve Bank uses a ‘fan chart’ as a tool to estimate the range of future price levels 
(SARB 2001b: 26-27). An inflation forecast is subject to a large degree of uncertainty, 
and the fan chart depicts the degree of uncertainty surrounding the projection, but the 
MPC appears to have paid lip-service to the fan charts and other tools when making 
interest-rate decisions.  
 
January 2002- December 2002: A period of rising interest rates 
 
The prime overdraft rate was increased on 4 occasions during the course of 2002. It was 
increased from 14 percent on 16 January 2002 to 17 percent on 16 September 2002. 
 
During this period, monetary policy was dominated by the response to the sharp 
depreciation of the rand in November and December 2001. The MPC did not have a 
target for the exchange rate, but  
 
…clearly the path of the exchange rate is a factor that has to be taken 
into account in determining the stance of monetary policy (SARB 
2001b: 21). 
 
 
The rand’s depreciation had a negative impact on the inflation outlook. CPIX inflation 
continued to rise (see Table 5.3) and there was also a concern about the continued high 
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rate of growth in the money supply and credit extension, the state of the balance of 
payments and the acceleration in labour costs (SARB 2002: 1). 
 
In light of these facts, the SARB decided to raise interest rates during this period. These 
interest rate increases were justified on the basis that, in the wake of the rand’s 
depreciation, it was necessary to prevent inflation from escalating. Higher interest rates 
were intended to dampen consumer spending while at the same time, improving interest 
rate differentials. 
5.4.4      Concluding remarks on the Mboweni period 
 
A feature of monetary policy has been the ‘stop-go’ phenomenon where monetary policy 
was tightened only when inflation had clearly moved up. So, instead of being pre-
emptive, monetary policy was reactive in the sense that it was only changed when 
inflationary expectations became entrenched and were reflected in wage demands. This 
required a tighter monetary policy stance in terms of higher interest rates and for longer 
periods than might otherwise have been the case (SARB 2001b: 4).  
 
Inflation targeting is intended to be a forward-looking approach, responding to expected 
future price developments only. However, the Bank’s avowed forward- looking rhetoric is 
questionable. Instead it appears that the Bank still responds to current CPIX data when 
making interest rate decisions.  
 
In an inflation-targeting framework, the primary objective of monetary policy is the 
attainment of price stability. This does not, however, exclude the impact of economic 
growth on monetary policy decisions, as the state of the economy is one of the important 
determinants of the rate of inflation. For instance, a downturn in the domestic economy 
reduces the pressure on demand inflation and creates scope for an easing of monetary 
policy. This does not mean that the monetary policy objective of lowering inflation is 
abandoned, rather that the level of aggregate demand or the state of the economy is such 
that the lower interest rates will not hinder the attainment of the inflation target. The 
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objective is also not to achieve long-run price stability at all costs. Ideally the path to 
lower inflation should not result in excessively high interest rates and or excessively 
sharp reductions in output (SARB 2001a: 4-5). 
 
Although Mboweni has not formally stated his theoretical framework, he has on many 
occasions hinted to an alignment with the Post Keynesian view. For example, in a speech 
given in Pretoria (Mboweni 2002a), he mentioned that the SARB’s role with respect to 
monetary policy is to ‘set the interest rate’. This differs from both De Kock and Stals, 
who maintained that the market determines short-term interest rates. 
 
With the adoption of an inflation-targeting framework, the SARB no longer recognised a 
stable relationship between the money supply and prices, which was the cornerstone of 
both Stals’s and De Kock’s theoretical framework. Mohr (1986: 28) argued that these 
frameworks were problematic in that they implied too narrow an approach to the 
diagnosis of inflation (eg by the De Kock Commission).  
 
Unlike the monetarist framework and its rigid adherence to the quantity theory of money 
(based on the assumption of a stable relationship between the growth in the money supply 
and inflation) the inflation-targeting framework implies that inflation is determined by a 
number of cost-push as well as demand-pull factors. Unlike the monetary targeting 
framework proposed by the De Kock Commission (1985), the inflation-targeting 
framework acknowledges that there are non-monetary elements in the inflation process. 
This implies that economic forces besides monetary aggregates are important in 
explaining the inflationary process. In Stals’s ‘principled monetarism’ and De Kock’s 
‘pragmatic monetarism’ non-monetary forces were ignored or downplayed, since they 
were inconsistent with the quantity theory of money. By abandoning the quantity theory 
of money, and aligning itself with an endogenous theory of the money supply, the SARB 
under Mboweni appears to have adopted a more explicit Post Keynesian approach. 
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     CHAPTER 6 
 
  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The conflict between neoclassical economics and modern day central banking is arguably 
most evident when dealing with interest rate theory. This dissertation has aligned itself 
with the Post Keynesian view of interest rate determination. The latter is distinctive in 
that it views the short-term interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy and not a 
market-determined price.   
 
This Post Keynesian view was supported by an analysis of the monetary frameworks 
each Reserve Bank Governor operated within. First we examined the De Kock era, which 
lasted from 1981 to 1989. The monetary policy framework applied during this period was 
defined by the De Kock Commission (1985: A13)  as being a blend of ‘conservative 
Keynesian demand management and pragmatic monetarism.’ Within this theoretical 
framework, De Kock repeatedly denied that the Bank was fixing either the level or the 
structure of interest rates. De Kock argued that short-term interest rates were determined 
by market forces and were ‘market related’ in the sense that the SARB followed the 
market in setting its rates. However, when there was a deliberate shift in monetary policy 
objectives, for instance in the 1985 – 1986 period where interest rates were reduced 
deliberately to promote growth at the expense of inflation, it becomes difficult to justify 
De Kock’s assertion that interest rates were determined by market forces. Moreover, we 
saw that in some instances during De Kock’s tenure, short-term interest rates were not 
only deliberately manipulated as a policy variable, but were also manipulated for political 
reasons, as demonstrated by the ‘Primrose prime’ incident. In the De Kock era it was 
plain to see that political meddling sometimes caused interest rates to move in a way that 
was unrelated to both market forces and economic theory. 
 
In the course of the analysis of the SARB’s monetary control system during the De Kock 
era it was shown that, although the framework included a commitment to monetary 
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targeting, it suggested that the cornerstone of monetarism – the quantity theory of money 
– was rejected in favour of a Post Keynesian approach to monetary control. The SARB’s 
exogenous Bank rate was the key operational variable used to control the demand for 
money and thus, indirectly, to maintain the rate of monetary growth within the SARB’s 
pre-determined monetary targets or guidelines. 
 
Dr Chris Stals succeeded Gerhard de Kock on 8 August 1989. He served as Governor for 
a full ten-year period, until August 1999. Stals described the Reserve Bank’s monetary 
control system as a ‘monetarist approach based on the direct control of the money supply 
(Stals 1997b: 36)’. Stals’s approach to monetary policy was not dissimilar to De Kock’s, 
however, his tenure at the Reserve Bank was characterised by greater Reserve Bank 
independence. This was a major breakthrough for interest rate policy. Independence 
meant that monetary policy decisions were free from the political meddling that was 
often evident in the De Kock era.  
 
Stals, like De Kock, was fond of telling his audiences that he did not set interest rates - he 
merely followed the lead of the financial markets. In his view, the market determines 
interest rates. In official statements on monetary policy during Stals’s tenure, the 
lowering of the inflation rate was accorded the highest priority, but the low levels of 
foreign exchange reserves often forced the Reserve Bank to apply a restrictive policy. In 
order to apply a restrictive policy (or a contractionary policy for that matter), the short-
term interest rate was deliberately manipulated to achieve inflation, exchange rate or 
balance of payments objectives. 
 
Tito Mboweni assumed office as Governor of the SARB on 8 August 1999. One of the  
most notable events of his Governorship was the formation of the MPC (Monetary Policy 
Committee). This committee sought to increase the transparency of monetary policy 
decisions by taking the interest rate decision-making process out of the hands of the 
Governor alone and entrusting it to a committee. On 20 February 2000, inflation targeting 
was formally introduced as the Reserve Bank’s new monetary policy framework. This 
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decision was in line with the tendency of foreign central banks to control the inflation 
rate as their primary objective in the interest of sustainable economic growth. One of the 
most distinctive features of the inflation targeting framework is the abandonment of the 
quantity theory. The inability of the Reserve Bank to control monetary aggregates was 
acknowledged as early as 1997, when Governor Stals argued that the effects of the 
integration of the South African economy into world markets was causing havoc with the 
Reserve Bank’s attempts to control monetary aggregates in the  interest of lowering 
inflation.  
 
The money supply is determined endogenously, in other words, the supply of money in a 
modern-credit economy is demand driven – a key Post Keynesian assumption.  The Post 
Keynesian view was explicitly adopted by Mboweni (2002b) when he acknowledged that 
the Reserve Bank is directly responsible for determining short-term interest rates. 
 
 
.  
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